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NO LONGER A SECOND-CLASS CLASS
ACTION?
FINDING COMMON GROUND IN THE
DEBATE OVER WAGE COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS WITH BEST PRACTICES FOR
LITIGATION AND ADJUDICATION
Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan*
Abstract
Rule 23 class actions include all potential members, if granted
certification. For wage claims, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) allows not class but
collective actions covering only those opting in. Courts have practiced
Rule 23-style gatekeeping in collective actions – requiring certification
motions, which they deny if members lack enough commonality. Our
2012 article argued against this practice. No statute or rule grants
judges the § 216(b) gatekeeping power early cases assumed, and with
good reason: opt-in reduces the agency problems justifying Rule 23
gatekeeping; and Congress passed § 216(b) as not a stricter, opt-in
form of class action, but liberalized joinder for wage claims
presumptively sharing a common issue justifying joinder. Our 2012
article argued that collective actions may proceed with no
“certification” process; instead, defendants must prove them improper
as Rule 21 “misjoinder” – and must do so under Rule 20 liberal
joinder, not Rule 23(b)(3) strict commonality, standards.
Some judges agreed, citing our article to allow no-certification
collective actions. Others judges, even if agreeing that collective
actions are joinder (not class) cases, noted that eliminating
certification raises difficult questions we never addressed.
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and Counsel at Outten & Golden LLP. Moss is Professor of Law and Schaden Chair in
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Jennifer Wadhwa for their helpful feedback, as well as their excellent research assistants
Maureen Chu and Bridget DuPey for their hard work.
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• If named plaintiffs and counsel are not certified to represent
others, how can they settle hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs’
claims?
• How can judges authorize notice to potential opt-ins without
certifying the propriety of litigating collectively?
• If opt-in plaintiffs are parties, not absentee class members,
must the trial evidence include all plaintiffs, or just a sample?

We now tackle these questions with a comprehensive set of
proposals.
(A) Judges assess notice if plaintiffs request, and the propriety
of collective treatment if defendants argue misjoinder.
(B) Defendants may challenge collective actions as Rule 21
misjoinder, and may settle collectively, subject to plaintiffs’
below obligations.
(C) Plaintiffs may litigate and solicit opt-ins without
certification – and court notice is an optional request – but
counsel must send consent, authority, and rights provisions
(“CARP”) detailing plaintiffs’:
(1)
rights to sue individually – if they prefer the
greater control of individual suit over collective litigation;
(2)
communication rights and duties – counsel must
inform them of proposed settlements or other major case
events; and
(3)
settlement consent and rights – they can opt out
of a collective settlement, but failing to opt out can serve as
settlement consent.
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs filing claims as a class action – whether civil rights,
environmental, consumer, or other group harms – must file a motion
for class “certification” with evidence proving their claims sufficiently
similar to litigate them together.1 Under a Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”)2 provision that preceded Rule 23, however, FLSA wage
claims proceed not as Rule 23 class actions covering all members not
opting out, but as collective actions covering only those opting in.3
That provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), lacks much detail on how
collective actions work. For decades, courts required, as under Rule
23(c), that plaintiffs file an evidence-supported certification motion
proving themselves “similarly situated” – the only phrase in § 216(b)
hinting at a standard for collective actions.4
Once a backwater topic compared to the Rule 23 class action,
the FLSA collective action is growing into its own as a topic of heated
controversy, following a dramatic trend: FLSA litigation grew over
500% from 1994 to 2014; it now is 3% of the entire federal civil docket,
“with most of that increase happening in the last 10 years.”5 Yet the
academic commentary has not kept up: a few law journal articles a
year, on average, address FLSA collective actions, far fewer than on
employment discrimination class actions.6 And most FLSA collective

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
4 See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 543 (2012)
[hereinafter Second-Class Class Action].
5 GAO: FLSA Lawsuits Rose 500% in Last 20 Years, 342 FAIR LAB. STANDARDS
HANDBOOK FOR STATES, LOC. GOV’T & SCH. NEWSL. 7, 7 (Mar. 2014) (“[T]he U.S.
Government Accountability Office . . . . found that 8,148 FLSA lawsuits were filed in fiscal
year 2012, up from . . . 1,327 in 1991. In 1991, FLSA lawsuits made up 0.6 percent of all
federal civil lawsuits. By 2012 they accounted for 3 percent of all civil lawsuits.”).
6 In Westlaw’s Law Reviews & Journals database, 33 articles since 2000 have
“216(b),” “16(b),” or “collective action” in the title and address the FLSA. That admittedly
is not an entirely comprehensive search, but one that should reach enough of the articles
on FLSA collective actions to show that there are only a few such articles per year, and
fewer than for employment discrimination class actions – because a similar article-title
search on that topic found five articles in 2017 alone. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 2018;
on file with author)
1
2
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action articles are not by academics: most are in bar journals7 or are
law review articles by litigators8 or law students.9 That is no criticism
of the bar: if anything, it shows the bar is well ahead of academia in
noticing, and struggling with, this important trend.
The literature not only is limited, but features highly divergent
views on whether FLSA collective actions should be easier, harder,
or just different. One view is that the certification standard should
be stricter: “courts should silence the recurring refrain that the
‘similarly situated’ standard is ‘less stringent’” than Rule 23 – mainly
the stringent 23(b)(3) requirement “common questions predominate”
and “individual questions do not predominate.”10 Another advocate
goes further, demanding not only predomination of common over
individual questions, but a “Unanimity Rule” insisting upon no
material divergence among the plaintiffs.11 Taking an opposing view
are articles arguing against requiring Rule 23(b)(3) “predomination”
of common issues in collective actions,12 defending the caselaw “that
7 Of the 33, five are in a private publisher’s professional publication (Aspatore); three
are in state bar magazines (New Jersey, Colorado, and Minnesota); three are in ABA
publications. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 2018; on file with author)
8 Five of the 33 are in a law journal symposium issue, but “written by experienced
practitioners . . . based upon presentations made at the National Employment Lawyers
Association (NELA) Impact Litigation Seminar.” Douglas D. Scherer & Robert Belton,
Introduction to the Symposium on Class and Collective Actions in Employment Law, 10
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 351, 352 (2006) (summarizing symposium contributions). Three
are by one employment litigator at a defense-side firm who writes regularly on the topic
(Allan G. King of Littler Mendelson, P.C.) and several others are by private-practice
litigators as well. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18, 2018; on file with author)
9 Six of the 33 are student notes or case comments. (Searches conducted on Oct. 18,
2018; on file with author)
10 Brian R. Gates, A “Less Stringent” Standard? How to Give FLSA Section 16(b) a Life
of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1553, 1558 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
11 Allan G. King & Andrew Gray, The Unanimity Rule: “Black Swans” and Common
Questions in FLSA Collective Actions, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2017) (proposing a new
“Unanimity Rule” of certifying only if “facts presented by the representative plaintiffs can
be extrapolated without exception to non-testifying plaintiffs,” making the key question: “Is
there a segment of plaintiffs, however small, who are different enough . . . that if the jury
were constrained to return a common answer for all . . . [it] would violate the Unanimity
Rule?”) (emphases added).
12 William C. Jhaveri-Weeks & Austin Webbert, Class Actions Under Rule 23 and
Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Preventing the Conflation of Two
Distinct Tools to Enforce the Wage Laws, 23 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 233, 266-67 (2016)
(“Even if individualized issues predominate . . . [or] employees are divided among different
work locations that all need to be evaluated separately, courts should still permit the case
to proceed on a collective basis whenever they can determine a workable method . . . . [A]
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court-authorized notice can and should be mailed to potential opt-in
class members at the pleading stage of the litigation upon a fairly
lenient evidentiary standard,”13 and criticizing arguments for more
pre-certification discovery or for greater “scrutiny [of] the proof that
potential class members are similarly situated.”14
In 2012, we levied a more fundamental criticism: there is
neither legal basis nor justification for requiring a judicial grant of
“certification” before FLSA wage claims can proceed as collective
actions.15 Our article, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, detailed
how no statute or rule grants judges the § 216(b) gatekeeping power
that early cases assumed and how this was no accidental omission
by legislators or rulemakers.16 Rather, the legislative history and
early FLSA caselaw confirm: Congress passed § 216(b) as not a
stricter, opt-in form of class action, but liberalized joinder for wage
claims presumptively sharing common issue justifying joinder.17 Nor
do the policy reasons for Rule 23 judicial gatekeeping apply to FLSA
collective actions: the § 216(b) opt-in requirement mitigates the
agency problems of Rule 23 classes – fear of lead class plaintiffs or
class counsel neglecting or selling out class members who never
chose to join.18 Our article thus argued that, contrary to decades of
caselaw, collective actions may proceed with no certification process;
instead, defendants must prove them improper as Rule 21
“misjoinder” and must do so under Rule 20 liberal joinder, not Rule
23(b)(3) strict commonality, standards.19
Surprising nobody more than us, some judges read SecondClass Class Action and agreed, citing it to rule that FLSA collective
actions need not have, and can proceed without, any certification
process – as in these first two such rulings:
court might nonetheless conclude that the FLSA claims can be tried using evidence from
several or all of the different locations. This accords with the goal of allowing employees to
challenge wage violations collectively.”).
13 David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 129, 156 (2003).
14 Id. at 146.
15 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 527-29.
16 Id. at 539-41.
17 Id. at 542-45.
18 Id. at 555-59.
19 Id. at 570-71.
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[P]laintiff moved . . . to conditionally certify . . . a collective action
. . . . [as] is common practice . . . under the FLSA . . . . However,
this approach is not specified by the plain text of the statute or
binding precedent. See generally Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan,
The Second–Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage
Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 Am. U.L. Rev. 523
(2012). The FLSA does not require that a plaintiff obtain
conditional certification of the collective action in order to
proceed . . . . The court denies plaintiff’s motion . . . as
unnecessary.20
[T]he “certification” rubric borrowed from Rule 23 has no place
in wage claim litigation . . . . [I] agree with legal scholars and
practitioners who have recently critiqued courts’ reliance on
class “certification” concepts in FLSA cases, finding them the
result of . . . a misunderstanding of precedent and legislative
intent, and excessive path dependence in the application of stare
decisis. See Scott A. Moss, Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class
Class Action . . . . In their well-crafted critique, Professors Moss
and Ruan explain that the . . . “class certification” approach to
FLSA collective actions . . . . [was] triggered by imprecise
pleading and “stare decisis yield[ing] path-dependence and lockin.” . . . The proper approach . . . is to presumptively allow
workers . . . to join as a collective . . . . [I]ndividuals may be
challenged . . . [if] their joinder proves erroneous [but,] . . . .
[r]ather than subject them to . . . proving commonality, . . .
handling them as any other challenge to a Rule 20 joinder[,] . . .
. [as] Rule 21 (misjoinder) and Rule 42 (severance).21

Of course, not everyone agreed with us. Some judges did agree,
citing either our article or the two initial decisions that cited it;22
other courts flatly rejected our approach;23 but a third category is
especially interesting. Specifically, some agreed with our diagnosis –
that collective actions are not as much like class actions as prior cases
20 McClendon v. United States, No. 12-81C, 2013 WL 285584, at *1-3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 24,
2013) (citing Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4).
21 Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1305-06, 1309 (D. Colo.
2015) (citing Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4), petition for mandamus denied, In
re Chipotle Grill, Inc., No. 17-1028, 2017 WL 4054144 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2017).
22 See infra Part II(B)(1) (collecting decisions).
23 See infra Part II(B)(2) (collecting decisions).
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assumed – yet reached very different conclusions about exactly what
collective actions are. Those judges agreed that FLSA collective
actions are less like Rule 23 class actions than previously thought,
but held that if Rule 20 joinder standards apply, then all members
are full party plaintiffs, not absent members represented by the lead
plaintiffs, such that discovery and personal settlement consent may
be require from each individual in the collective.24 Yet all such courts
– those deeming collective action plaintiffs individual parties and
those rejecting any certification process – raised difficult questions
that Second-Class Class Action never addressed.
• Settlement: If named plaintiffs or counsel are not certified to
represent others, how can they settle collective actions without
individual consent from potentially hundreds or thousands of
plaintiffs?
• Notice of right to join: If judges never scrutinize or certify
that litigating collectively is proper, how can they authorize
notice to potential opt-ins of the right to join, as was usual after
certification?
• Trial/discovery evidence: If opt-in plaintiffs are full parties,
not absent class members, must the discovery and trial evidence
– individual documents and testimony – include all of the
potentially hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs, or is just a
sample of the plaintiffs sufficient?

In retrospect, the problem is that our prior Article was
demolition without construction, the takedown of an edifice without
any blueprint for a new structure. Courts have admirably tried
different approaches; we now aim to fill the void left by the
demolition of the Rule 23-based certification scheme for collective
actions.
Part II reiterates only briefly our critique of existing
certification practice in our prior article, as a prelude to detailing the
mixed judicial responses to that article. Before any of our specific
solutions, Part III tackles a broad, big-picture issue that SecondClass Class Action did not fully address: that wage collective actions
are not class actions run by lead plaintiffs and class counsel, they still
are representative actions in which not every plaintiff must
24

See infra Part II(B)(3) (collecting decisions).
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participate fully. Part IV then details the prescriptions this Article
offers: a comprehensive set of best practices for how parties can
litigate, and courts can adjudicate, wage collective actions – in a
manner carefully walking the line between respecting that they are
representative actions and respecting the need to protect the rights
of all individual parties.
(A) Judges assess notice if plaintiffs request, and the propriety
of collective treatment if defendants argue misjoinder.
(B) Defendants may challenge collective actions as Rule 20
misjoinder, and may settle collectively, subject to plaintiffs’
below obligations.
(C) Plaintiffs may litigate and solicit opt-ins without
certification, and seeking court notice is optional – but counsel
must send consent, authority, and rights provisions (“CARP”)
detailing plaintiffs’:
(1)
rights to sue individually – if they prefer the
greater control of individual suit over collective litigation’s
efficiency;
(2)
communication rights and duties – counsel must
inform them of proposed settlements or other major case
events; and
(3)
settlement consent and rights – they can opt out of
a collective settlement, but failing to opt out can serve as
settlement consent.

II. FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: OUR CRITIQUE OF THE TURN
FROM ITS SIMPLIFIED JOINDER ORIGINS TO COMPLEX RULE 23LIKE PROCESSES.
A. The Existing Rule 23-Based Treatment of FLSA Collective
Actions, and Our Prior Article’s Critique of It.
Enacted in 1938, and applicable to later employment laws
codified in the same statutory chapter, § 216(b) of the FLSA provides
that “[a]n action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by
any one or more employees for . . . other employees similarly
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situated.”25 Congress amended § 216(b) in 1947 to require workers
themselves to be the plaintiffs26 and to require anyone other than an
original plaintiff to “opt in” affirmatively, by filing a written
consent.27 Enacted before modern class actions existed,28 § 216(b)
does not mention any judicial gatekeeping power over whether a case
can proceed as a collective action; § 216(b) requires merely that
members be “similarly situated” and opt in individually.
To determine whether workers are “similarly situated” enough
for an FLSA collective action, courts for decades required a two-stage
“certification” process. First, at the “notice stage,” courts decide
whether a collective action is proper to justify notifying potential
members that they can opt into a collective action by evaluating
whether the potential opt-ins are “similarly situated” to the named
plaintiffs. Notice of the collective action is key in alerting workers to
their FLSA claims, because the two-year statute of limitations
continues to run until the person has opted into the action through
written consent. Judicial oversight of notice derives from HoffmannLa Roche Inc. v. Sperling, in which the Supreme Court never
mentioned any “certification” process, but held that to serve the
“broad remedial goal” of the FLSA, and in light of the “wisdom and
necessity for early judicial intervention,” courts may manage the
notice and opt-in process.29
At this initial “notice stage,” the court requires evidentiary
proof, such as worker affidavits and corporate documents, that
potential opt-ins are “similarly situated” – typically, working similar
jobs and alleging “a common policy or plan that violated the law.”30
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts
Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 727, 731-32 (2010) (citing James M. Fraser, Opt-In Class Actions Under the FLSA,
EPA, and ADEA: What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV.
95, 98 (2004)) (arguing that earlier version of FLSA enabled uninterested parties to launch
“fishing expeditions [that] were costly to employers”).
27 See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (noting that the
1947 Portal-to-Portal Act added a “requirement that an employee file a written consent”).
28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee’s Note to 1966 Amendment (noting that
Congress enacted the modern version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure several
decades after the FLSA).
29 Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1989).
30 Hoffman v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
25
26
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In a second stage, “decertification,” the court undertakes a more
searching evidentiary inquiry, typically on a post-discovery defense
motion, and decertifies the collective action if it deems the workers
insufficiently similar.31
However, courts have differed significantly on how much
evidentiary “proof” to require at each stage, and what legal standard
of “similarly situated” to apply. Many courts describe the first-stage
burden as “minimal,”32 a “modest factual showing,”33 or a “not . . .
exacting” standard that plaintiffs can satisfy with “the allegations of
the complaint and any supporting affidavits filed by the plaintiff.”34
Yet decisions describing the first-stage burden in such lenient terms
still disagree on how much similarity § 216(b) requires: in some, “the
‘similarly situated’ requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is considerably
less stringent than the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) that
common questions ‘predominate,’” requiring only an “identifiable
nexus” among plaintiffs;35 others deny certification where plaintiffs
cannot show that all members “were together the victims of a single
decision, policy, or plan.”36 Still others never describe the burden on
plaintiffs seeking early-stage notice as any lighter than Rule 23 class
plaintiffs’ certification burden, applying to § 216(b) the “normal class
actions requirements” of Rule 23,37 such as “predomination” of
common questions over individual ones.38
31 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Ed. Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2009);
Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2007); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec.
Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001).
32 Strauch v. Computer Sci. Corp., No. 3:14cv956, 2015 WL 3727804, at *2 (D. Conn.
June 9, 2015) (citing Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)).
33 Griffin v. Aldi, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-354 (LEK/ATB), 2017 WL 1397320, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2017) (citing Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also
Gjurovich v. Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(requiring “modest factual showing” that plaintiffs are similarly situated).
34 Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Solutions, LLC, No. 17-cv-01064-NYW, 2018 WL
3470604, at *3-4 (D. Colo. 2018).
35 Heagney v. European Am. Bank, 122 F.R.D. 125, 127, 127 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
36 Peterson, 2018 WL 3470604, at *3 (quoting Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102).
37 See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263, 266-68 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to prove “normal class actions requirements,” including “numerosity,
typicality, [and] adequacy”), abrogated in part by Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102.
38 See, e.g., St. Leger v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 123 F.R.D. 567, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding
certification inappropriate, and plaintiffs not similarly situated, because common questions
did not “predominate,” a standard derived from Rule 23(b)(3)).
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In the second stage, decertification, courts more commonly
import Rule 23 standards. Many decisions decertify collective actions
by finding insufficient evidence of common facts among all members,
including common polices or common employment settings, such as
where the employer wage practices were decentralized among
different managers, sites, or job categories.39 Thus, most courts
ultimately require Rule 23 commonality for § 216(b) collective actions
– just with disagreement as to whether to do so at the first or second
stage.
Yet this entire Rule 23-based “certification” edifice arose from a
conflation of very different multi-plaintiff litigation vehicles, our
2012 article argued.40 Section 216(b), is not an opt-in version of Rule
23; it is a liberalized form of simple Rule 20 joinder, which permits
joint suit whenever claims share one common issue and address
related events.41 Nothing in § 216(b), or any other statutory or rule
text on collective actions, authorizes any “certification” inquiry, nor
is such judicial gatekeeping justified by economic logic: Rule 23
classes present principal-agent and asymmetric information
problems because lead plaintiffs can inadequately represent
unengaged members, while §216(b) collective members are party
plaintiffs with individual claims, which obviates the need for judicial
scrutiny.42
Notably for an area with so much high-stakes litigation, the
Supreme Court, while repeatedly detailing the need for close scrutiny
of Rule 23 class actions, never has mandated anything like a twostage certification process for § 216(b) collective actions.43 The main
Supreme Court precedent on § 216(b), Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v.
Sperling, never addressed whether such cases require “certification,”
holding only that courts are authorized to supervise “notice” of opt39 See, e.g., Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
(citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007)); Rappaport v.
Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 6:07-cv-468-Orl-19DAB, 2007 WL 4482581, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
18, 2007); Jimenez v. Lakeside Pic-N-Pac, L.L.C., No. 1:06-CV-456, 2007 WL 4454295, at
*5 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2007); Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1950 (WGB), 2006 WL
42368, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006); D’Anna v. M/A-Com, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Md.
1995).
40 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 549-53.
41 Id. at 542-45.
42 Id. at 555-59.
43 Id. at 541.
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in rights sent to potential members.44 While not addressing how
much commonality the “similarly situated” standard requires,
Hoffmann-LaRoche did repeatedly use the word “joinder” to describe
§ 216(b) opt-in: it stated that a worker filing a “consent form . . .
fulfill[s] the statutory requirement of joinder,”45 and that its decision
on court-supervised notice was based on courts “managerial
responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties.”46 More
recently, a Supreme Court decision shortly after our 2012 article
arguably implied that the entire “certification” analysis should not
be treated as a Rule 23-style inquiry into whether members are
similar enough. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,47 while a
holding only on one tangential issue (the effect of Rule 68 offers of
judgment to collective action named plaintiffs), noted two key points:
that “[t]he sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending
of court-approved written notice to employees, who in turn become
parties . . . only by filing written consent”48; and that given this
limited import of § 216(b) certification, there are “significant
differences between certification under . . . [Rule] 23 and the joinder
process under § 216(b).”49 Genesis Healthcare thus supports our 2012
argument against the prevailing two-stage § 216(b) certification
process.
Accordingly, judicial gatekeeping via two-step certification is
unauthorized for § 216(b) collective actions. In our adversarial
system, parties file and resolve cases as they wish, absent specific
rules granting judges authority over such decisions. Instead, § 216(b)
opt-in is just simplified joinder, not a narrowing of traditional
joinder. The contention that § 216(b) aimed to facilitate (not limit)
joinder is supported by caselaw beginning soon after the 1947

44 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989) (“[T]his case presents
the narrow question whether . . . district courts may play any role in prescribing . . .
communication from the named plaintiffs to the potential members of the class on whose
behalf the collective action has been brought. We hold that district courts have discretion .
. . to implement 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) . . . by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs.”).
45 Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 170-71 (emphasis added).
47 Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013).
48 Id. at 75 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
49 Id. at 70 n.1 (emphasis added).
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enactment of § 216(b); cases such as Hoffmann-LaRoche and Genesis
Healthcare Corp. regularly called it a “joinder” provision.50
Rule 23, enacted in 1966, did not apply to FLSA collective
actions because Rule 23 created class actions that automatically
include all members, and it did not repeal or displace the federal
statute, § 216(b), that restricted FLSA collective actions to those who
opt in affirmatively. Yet Rule 23 applied to virtually all other types
of claims, from employment discrimination to securities to
environmental to consumer claims, so it came to be the most
commonly used, and thus most well-understood, aggregate litigation
form.51 As our 2012 article noted, “[t]his left the misimpression that
§ 216(b) collective actions are a tighter version of class actions
(because of the opt-in requirement) rather than a liberalized form of
joinder.”52
Importantly, the standards under Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule 24
(intervention of new plaintiffs) are far more liberal than under Rule
23. Joinder requires only that claims address “the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and share “any
question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs.”53 This standard is
permissive: the transaction/occurrence requirement demands only
“logically related events,” not the same events;54 the one “common
See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945).
See e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1851 n.98
(2008) (“From the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the federal courts were unwilling to
certify even relatively simple ‘single event/single situs’ mass accident torts as class actions,
but by the late 1980s they were certifying far more complicated and multifaceted [classes]
. . . . The next decade brought a growing number of such cases into the national courts.”);
Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 287 (2008)
(“[D]uring the 1970s and 1980s, federal courts interpreted . . . Rule 23(b)(3) to allow . . .
large-scale class actions.”).
52 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 543 (emphasis in original).
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (requiring same showing
for intervention: that a claim “shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact”).
54 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1653, at 409 (3d ed. 2001 & 2011 Supp.); see also Montgomery v. STG
Int’l, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the requirement that “claims
arise from the same transaction or occurrence or series of occurrences” is satisfied “if the
claims are logically related”); see e.g., Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333
(8th Cir. 1974) (explaining that “[a]bsolute identity of all events is unnecessary”).
50
51
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question” standard allows for plaintiffs otherwise differing factually
or in their relief.55 This liberal joinder standard dates to 1938, when
the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated “the old
formalistic approach” to strict common law and code pleading in
favor of broadly joining multiple parties.56 Courts thus routinely
grant joinder broadly, to serve “principles of trial convenience and
efficiency.”57
Plaintiffs joining claims under Rule 20 do not engage in
anything like what the common § 216(b) certification requires.
Plaintiffs suing together need not file any motion for joinder; they
just list all their names together in the complaint caption.58 If more
plaintiffs want to join later, Rule 24(b)(1) expressly requires them to
file a motion to intervene,59 but the text of § 216(b) requires no
motion. To the contrary: “[t]here is no provision in § 216(b) for a
‘certification’ inquiry like in Rule 23(c)(1), no provision for scrutiny of
plaintiffs’ counsel like in Rule 23(g), and, more generally, no
requirements analogous to those in the Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and Rule
23(b)(1)-(3) seven-subsection labyrinth.”60 Rather, § 216(b) only
requires two criteria: members must be “similarly situated” and
must make one of the types of employment claims covered by §
216(b), such as FLSA minimum wage or overtime claim, age
discrimination, or gender pay discrimination.61

55 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(3) (providing that each party need not seek “all the relief
demanded [because] [t]he court may grant judgment to one or more” separately).
56 Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 815 (1989); see
also John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 707
(1976) (noting concerns that multiple suits proceeding independently can yield redundancy
or inconsistency).
57 Vulcan Soc’y v. White Plains, 82 F.R.D. 379, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Am. Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 597
F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (D. Minn. 2009); In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 WL
2645971, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547, 549
(W.D. Wis. 1999).
58 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).
59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1).
60 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 540.
61 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (2018); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018); Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018).
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Nor is reading § 216(b) as a tightening of joinder consistent with
the statutory history and purposes. The FLSA was enacted in 1938
to remedy “substandard labor conditions”62 by setting a minimum
wage, mandating overtime premium pay, requiring accurate
employer time records, and banning child labor.63 As one
commentator noted, Congress was purposeful in recognizing that
“social and judicial interests in the economical and efficient
resolution of controversies argued for allowing one employee to
challenge the unfair practice while permitting all similarly affected
employees to be present . . . and reap any benefits of a favorable
judgment.”64 By their nature, wage cases often challenge entire
industry pay practices, spanning hundreds or thousands of
workers.65 Especially for low-wage workers, disallowing collective
actions ends the claims; individual suits are cost-prohibitive.66 Even
when collective actions proceed, certification motions yield cost and
delay, thwarting claims and deterring attorneys, especially given the
short statute of limitations that is not automatically tolled during the
often-extensive § 216(b) motion practice.67
In sum, the cumbersome, two-stage “certification” process,
regardless of whether a court grants or denies a motion to certify,
impedes efficient adjudication of wage claims – which is especially
troubling given that no certification process is authorized or
compelled by statute, rule, or Supreme Court precedent.

Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft, supra note 26, at 731.
29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a)(1), 211(c), 212 (2018).
64 Gates, supra note 10, at 1526; see also Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft, supra note 26,
at 731 (detailing how the Congress that enacted the FLSA aimed to facilitate
representative actions for effective redress of what it saw as then-prevalent detrimental
labor conditions negatively affecting workers’ “health, efficiency and general well-being”).
65 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 1633 (citing Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How
Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1103, 1118–19 (2012)).
67 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2018).
62
63
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B. Judicial Responses to Second-Class Class Action: Some
Adopt It and Others Reject It – While Others Agree Partially, in
Unanticipated Ways.
1. The Positive Response: Courts Limiting or Dismantling the
Practice of Two-Stage Certification Based on Second-Class Class
Action.
Unexpectedly to us, some judges actually cited Second-Class
Class Action in agreeing with one or both of its two main arguments:
(a) that § 216(b) opt-in standard is lenient, more like Rule 20 joinder
than Rule 23 class membership; and (b) that no “certification” at all
is required for § 216(b) collective actions.

a. Liberalizing Opt-In as Lenient Joinder, Not Rule 23 Scrutiny
–Because Prior § 216(b) “Certification” Practice is a “Misnomer”
or “Conflicts with … the Statute.”
Some courts cited Second-Class Class Action to adopt more
lenient standards for § 216(b) opt-in, because (a) opt-in is like Rule
20 joinder, not Rule 23 class membership, and (b) the purpose of
“certification” is deciding on notice, not creating a Rule 23-style class.
Courts sometimes supported those holdings by expressly criticizing
the prevailing “certification” process. Alderoty v. Maxim Healthcare
Services, Inc., for example, cited our point:
[A]ny conditional certification process, including the two-step
process, conflicts with the [FLSA] language . . . [B]ecause all
employees who join . . . [a] collective action, unlike a Rule 23
class . . . , opt in[] . . . , it would be unfair to impose a significantly
more stringent initial barrier than . . . [R.] 20 . . . . [That] § 216(b)
does not describe any judicial role in certifying . . . has been cited
in support of the argument that any conditional certification
process, including the two-step process, conflicts with the
language of the statute, and that joining . . . should be governed
by Rule 20 (permissive joinder) and Rule 21 (misjoinder).68

While not going as far, Oldershaw v. DaVita Healthcare
Partners, Inc., in calling § 216(b) certification a “misnomer,” declared
68 Alderoty v. Maxim Healthcare Services, No. TDC-14-2549, 2015 WL 5675527, at*5,
*5 n.2 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2015) (citing Second Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 533-34).
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that it “agree[d]” with the leading decision that cited Second-Class
Class Action in rejecting certification:
[T]he Court agrees with the careful and thoughtful reasoning of
Judge Kane in Turner . . . that “conditional certification” in a
“collective action” is somewhat of a misnomer. . . . “[C]onditional
certification” is the vehicle by which a court authorizes a named
plaintiff to give . . . notice to other employees. . . . Consonant with
the notice’s limited purpose, the standard for court approval is
lenient. . . . In contrast, certification of a class under Rule 23 is
more significant and serves an entirely different purpose.69

b. Rejecting § 216(b) Collective Action “Certification” Entirely.
The first federal decision citing Second-Class Class Action to
reject certification was a worker misclassification case against the
Veterans Administration, McClendon v. United States.70 While
recognizing that two-stage certification is “common practice,”
McClendon denied plaintiffs’ motion for certification as
“unnecessary,” citing Second-Class Class Action; it simply
authorized notice.71
The second such decision was the one that drew both significant
attention and appellate review: District of Colorado Judge John L.
Kane’s decision in Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.72 In Turner,
restaurant workers alleged that the timekeeping system
automatically clocked them out before they finished working, which
denied full wages, including overtime premium pay, to roughly
10,000 employees.73 Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification and
dissemination of court-authorized notice.74 The decision began by
discussing Second-Class Class Action:
[T]he “certification” rubric borrowed from Rule 23 has no place
in wage claim litigation under the FLSA. It mires cases in
69 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114-15 (D.
Colo. 2017).
70 McClendon v. United States, No. 12-81C, 2013 WL 285584, at *1, *1 n.2 (Fed. Cl.
Jan. 24, 2013).
71 Id. at *1-2.
72 See generally Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,123 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (D. Colo.
2015).
73 Id. at 1301-03.
74 Id. at 1301.
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procedural prerequisites that thwart wage-earners’ rights to
discovery and redress. Instead, I agree with legal scholars and
practitioners who have recently critiqued courts’ reliance on
class “certification” concepts in FLSA cases, finding them the
result of a confluence of factors, including haphazard
terminology, a misunderstanding of precedent and legislative
intent, and excessive path dependence in the application of stare
decisis. . . . In their well-crafted critique, Professors Moss and
Ruan explain that the use of a two-stage “class certification”
approach to FLSA collective actions . . . [was] triggered by
imprecise pleading and “stare decisis yield[ing] pathdependence and lock-in.” . . . The only requirement, per the
statute, was that each plaintiff “gives his consent in writing . . .
and such consent is filed in the court. . . .”75

The Turner District Court concluded, “[t]he proper approach,
and the one I apply, is to presumptively allow workers bringing the
same statutory claim against the same employer to join as a
collective, with the understanding that individuals may be
challenged and severed from the collective if the basis for their
joinder proves erroneous.”76 Dispensing with “certification,” the
Court allowed any of the roughly 10,000 workers to opt in, allowed
notice to the workers, tolled the statute of limitations, and held that
if discovery later shows the workers not similarly situated, but “too
different for collective treatment,” then “Rule 21 (misjoinder) and
Rule 42 (severance) are the proper vehicles for challenging individual
plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action, and that is the process to be
followed.”77
Chipotle then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for mandamus relief,
requesting dismissal of the opt-in plaintiffs or, alternatively,
discovery as to which opt-ins truly are similarly situated, so Chipotle
could seek to decertify the collective.78 The Tenth Circuit denied
mandamus, allowing the district court ruling to stand in a decision
that supported much of its, and our 2012 Article’s, reasoning.79
Id. at 1305-06 (citing Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4).
Id. at 1309.
77 Id.
78 In re Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 17-1028, 2017 WL 4054144, at *1 (10th Cir.
Mar. 27, 2017).
79 Id. at *3-4.
75
76
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The Circuit noted that Congress never defined “similarly
situated,” nor set any particular collective action process – and then
it reviewed the leading Circuit § 216(b) precedent, Thiessen v. Gen.
Elec. Capital Corp.80 Noting that district courts must determine who
is similarly situated in a “manner that is orderly, sensible, and not
otherwise contrary to statutory commands or . . . Federal Rules,”81
Thiessen discussed three different approaches to the “similarly
situated” determination:
• the common two-step certification process that, historically,
has been called the “ad hoc approach”;
• the “Rule 23 approach” that imported strict commonality
and predominance standards from class action practice; and
• the pre-1966 requirements for opt-in class actions under the
old form of Rule 23 that existed at the time when the FLSA and
§ 216(b) were enacted – historically called the “spurious class
action” approach, reflecting the quasi-class/quasi-individual
nature of opt-in actions.82

Thiessen held that the district court, in an ADEA case, “did not
abuse its discretion in adopting the ad hoc approach” that required
“certification.”83
Thiessen and similar precedent in other circuits deemed the ad
hoc certification approach permissible, spurring districts to adopt it
widely – but it is not mandatory, as the Tenth Circuit in Turner
clarified. The Turner District Court’s approach was similar to the
“spurious class action” approach, the Circuit explained – requiring
opt-in, but not requiring pre-opt-in “certification” – and “nothing in
Thiessen proscribes the district court from following the spurious
approach consistent with § 216(b)”; rather, “the district court’s order
is consistent with § 216(b).”84 While not rejecting the claimed defense
right to challenge opt-in plaintiffs, the Circuit explained that such a

80 Id. at *1 (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
81 Id. (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)).
82 Id. at *1-2 (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-03).
83 Id at *2. (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105).
84 Id at *2-3.
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challenge need not be a “threshold determination” occurring “prior
to” opt-in:
Chipotle’s repeated reference to a threshold determination is
misplaced, as there is no statutory mandate for any initial
determination; the only requirement that § 216(b) imposes is
that plaintiffs be similarly situated. Chipotle identifies no
authority from the Supreme Court or this court stating
otherwise or prohibiting the district court’s . . . process here. . . .
Chipotle thus conflates § 216(b)’s requirement with some sort of
burden on the plaintiffs to prove similarity prior to formation of
the collective.85

The Circuit further accepted the District Court’s view that §
216(b) opt-in should be judged by Rule 20-21 joinder and misjoinder
standards, not the stricter commonality requirements for damages
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).86 The Tenth Circuit agreed with
the Eleventh Circuit that “‘section 216(b)’s “similarly situated”
requirement is less stringent than that for joinder under Rule
20(a).’”87 The Tenth Circuit also cited Rule 21, and courts’ flexibility
to sever or dismiss, in rejecting Chipotle’s argument that the District
Court’s approach raised “the specter of thousands of opt-in plaintiffs
found by the district court to be misjoined and subsequently severed
into what could be an absurd number of lawsuits.”88 Whether claims
should remain together or be severed, the Circuit explained, is a
matter of trial and pretrial management discretion, but may be
premature to decide early in pretrial: “it is still speculative to assume
that each misjoined opt-in plaintiff would merit a singular lawsuit as
opposed to a grouping scheme the district court has discretion to
determine.”89
More decisions then cited either McClendon and Turner
approvingly, either (a) as precedent the decision followed, in rejecting
any need for “certification,”90 or (b) in dicta, citing the no-certification
Id. at *3 (emphases added).
Id.
87 Id. (quoting Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 E.g., Jones v. Weatherford Labs., Inc., No. 16-cv-01385-JLK, 2017 WL 6945032, at
*1-2 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2017) (allowing collective action notice to potential members, but
85
86
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precedents with either approval or dispassionate discussion, but
declining to adopt that approach, either because the parties never
expressly advocated it91 or because the facts supported traditional
certification, making it unnecessary to decide whether to require
certification.92

holding “certification” unnecessary: “Instead, the court’s function in defining the collective
is to determine, on motions of the defendant brought pursuant to . . . [Rule] 12 or 21,
whether plaintiffs who have opted-in are ‘similarly situated.’ . . . [Thus] I expressly and
explicitly reject the characterization of this order as a ‘certification.’”) (citing Turner v.
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1309-10 (D. Colo. 2015); Second-Class
Class Action, supra note 4, at 572) (emphases added)); Johnston v. Coleman Music &
Entm’t, L.L.C., No. 3:12-cv-448-J-99TJC-TEM, 2013 WL 12159256, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8,
2013) (“Plaintiff’s failure to move for certification does not require dismissal of the opt-in
plaintiffs. . . . Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, this does not mean that Plaintiff ‘has
abandoned his collective action claims’ [] and that the opt-in plaintiffs must consequently
be thrown out . . . . Rather, the [failure to move] . . . indicat[es] there was no need to facilitate
notice of the action to other[s] . . . .” (citing McClendon, 2013 WL 285584, at *1)).
91 See, e.g., Whitlow v. Crescent Consulting, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 417, 420, 420 n.2 (W.D.
Okla. 2017) (“Since Thiessen, the undersigned has applied the two-step approach in FLSA
actions, despite the fact that Thiessen arose under the ADEA. . . . To the extent Defendant
argues Thiessen and its ad hoc approach do not apply, the Court would alternatively adopt
the analysis set forth by the District of Colorado in Turner . . . . Nothing in Defendant’s
brief convinces this Court . . . [to] deviate from . . . the ad hoc approach to certification in
this FLSA action.”); Sanchez v. Simply Right, Inc., No. 15-cv-00974-RM-MEH, 2017 WL
2230079, at *2 (D. Colo. May 22, 2017) (“Defendants ask that this Court not follow the
precise two-step process outlined in Thiessen [and] [i]nstead . . . enforce a ‘heightened
standard’ of ‘similarly situated’ . . . . The Court will not do so. . . . [T]he Tenth Circuit has
recently discussed Thiessen, . . . but that discussion does not help defendants in any way.”);
id. at *3 n.4 ([H]ere, plaintiffs sought application of the two-stage ad hoc approach. [] The
Court makes no finding whether in another case, in which the plaintiff(s) sought
certification under the spurious approach used by the district court in In re Chipotle Grill,
the Court would apply the ad hoc or spurious approaches.”).
92 See, e.g., Hornaday v. Mtn. States Casing, LLC, No. 15-cv-1011-WJM-KLM, 2016
WL 8253896, at *1 n.1 (D. Colo. June 8, 2016) (citing Turner and noting arguments
supporting it, but holding that it need not decide whether to follow it, both because Plaintiff
moved for certification without expressly requesting the Turner approach and because the
wage policy undisputedly was common enough for even traditional “certification”
requirements: “Judge . . . Kane recently issued an opinion criticizing Thiessen and finding
that the ‘single decision, policy, or plan’ portion of . . . Thiessen . . . is not binding in FLSA
collective actions . . . . [Plaintiff] points out Turner in a footnote, apparently as a form of
implicit encouragement to follow its lead. . . . [Defendant] responds . . . [that] ‘Turner should
not be followed.’ . . . This dispute – if it is a dispute – is immaterial because [Defendant]
does not argue that [Plaintiff’s certification] motion should be denied for failure to allege a
single decision, policy, or plan.”); Bracamontes v. Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A. Inc., No. 15-cv02324-RBJ, 2017 WL 3190605, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. July 19, 2017) (“Finding that plaintiffs
are entitled to conditional certification under the more rigorous Thiessen standard, I need
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2. The Negative Response: Courts Disagreeing with SecondClass Class Action and Still Requiring Two-Stage “Certification.”
Some courts, however, decidedly disagreed with the approach of
Second-Class Class Action, either on the merits or because it went
against long-established practice.93 For example, in Augustyniak v.
Lowe’s Home Ctr., LLC, an FLSA collective action claiming that
human resources managers were misclassified as overtime-exempt,
the plaintiffs followed the common practice in the Second Circuit of
moving for conditional certification.94 The District Court denied the
motion, holding that “‘plaintiff has failed to make even the “modest
showing” required for pre-discovery conditional certification’ of a
nationwide class.’”95 Further, before the certification motion, over 50
opt-ins filed consents to join, so the Court proceeded to discuss the
import of certification and the “similarly situated” standard.96
First, though holding that certification denial “does not
automatically require dismissal of those plaintiffs who opted into the
case without such notice,”97 Augustyniak disagreed with the Turner
not address the parties’ arguments on whether or not the more lenient standard discussed
and adopted in Turner by my colleague, Judge Kane, should apply.”).
93 See, e.g., Huertero-Morales v. Raguboy Corp., No. 17 Civ. 2429 (JCF), 2017 WL
4046337, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (“[P]laintiffs argue that the Court should follow
Turner . . . . [which] found that the two-step process is inappropriate and that allowing
simple permissive joinder is the correct approach to Section 216(b) collectives. . . . [T]his is
contrary to long-established practice in the Second Circuit. Accordingly, I decline to apply
Turner.”) (citations ommitted); Rojas v. Kalesmeno Corp., No. 17 Civ. 0164 (JCF), 2017 WL
3085340, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) (“[P]laintiffs argue that the Court should follow
Turner . . . . [which] found that the two step process is inappropriate and that allowing
simple permissive joinder is the correct approach to Section 216(b) collectives. . . . [O]ther
courts in . . . this Circuit have rejected calls to adopt the Turner approach. Accordingly, I
decline to apply Turner.”) (citations omitted); Gomez v. Terri Vegetarian LLC, No. 17-CV213 (JMF), 2017 WL 2628880, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017) (“Plaintiff invites the
Court to follow Turner . . . in holding that he need not meet any burden for others to join
his FLSA suit . . . . But Plaintiff abandons that argument in his reply memorandum . . .
[and] acknowledges that it is contrary to the approach . . . [in] the Second Circuit.
Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation.”); Augustyniak v. Lowe’s Home Ctr.,
LLC, No. 14-CV-00488-JJM, 2016 WL 462346, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016) (citing but
rejecting Turner, instead requiring certification based on “similarly situated” proof).
94 Augustyniak v. Lowe’s Home Center, No. 14-CV-00488-JJM, 2016 WL 462346
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016).
95 Id. at *1.
96 Id. at *1-2.
97 Id. at *2.
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holding that workers “‘may “consent” to join the action merely by
filing an appropriate form, and it then becomes the responsibility of
the other parties to move the court to dismiss or sever . . . .’”98
Augustyniak deemed Second Circuit precedent that plaintiffs may
opt in only “‘so long as such plaintiffs are similarly situated to the
named individual plaintiff’”99 to mean that “[t]he burden remains
with Plaintiffs to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that they
and the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated.”100
While disagreeing with Turner on the procedure for determining
“similarly situated,” Augustyniak agreed on the substantive standard
– but proceeded to apply it in a stricter fashion. Augustyniak quoted
the Eleventh Circuit in Grayson for the rule that “‘the “similarly
situated” requirement of § 216(b) is more elastic and less stringent
than the requirements found in Rule 20.’”101 Yet Augustyniak
proceeded to demand fairly stringent commonality: “‘district courts
in this circuit typically look to the (1) disparate factual and
employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) defenses
available to defendants which appear to be individual to each
plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural considerations counseling
for or against collective action treatment.’”102 Augustyniak thus held
that for each opt-in “to remain in this action,” the named plaintiff
“must prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that the opt-in “is
similarly situated to her with respect to FLSA violations.”103
Other courts similarly have rejected the idea of a nocertification collective action and demanded stronger commonality
proof than under Rule 20. For example, in Huertero-Morales v.
Raguboy Corp., an FLSA collective action involving restaurant
workers’ claims of off-the-clock work and tip pool impropriety,
Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification, but also asked the
Court to follow Turner and reject any need for certification.104 The
98
99
100
101
102

2011))

Id. (quoting Turner, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1306).
Id. (quoting Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1095 (11 Cir. 1996)).
Id. (quoting Zivali v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y.

Id. at *3.
Huertero-Morales v. Raguboy Corp., No. 17 Civ. 2429 (JCF), 2017 WL 4046337, at
*1, *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017).
103
104
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Court cited precedent applying the certification process as authority
that the Turner approach “is contrary to long-established practice in
the Second Circuit”105; then, without examining the issue further,
declared that it “decline[s] to apply Turner.”106 Other cases, some
citing Turner and some not, continue to apply traditional two-stage
certification without expressly addressing the arguments against
it.107

3. The Unexpected Response: Courts Agreeing with Our
Diagnosis, But Reaching Different Prescriptions – Restricting
(Not Liberalizing) Collective Actions in Various Ways by
Deeming them Individual (Not Representative) Actions.
Some courts, while agreeing that FLSA collective actions are
less like class actions than previously recognized, saw that
observation as creating new confusion about how such litigation
should proceed. If collective action plaintiffs are less like Rule 23
class members and more like full parties entering the case through
joinder, then that raises questions, these courts noted, about how, if
at all, the named plaintiffs alone (or with a small sample of opt-in
plaintiffs) can represent all the other plaintiffs – in discovery, at trial,
or in any possible settlement.

a. Requiring Individualized Evidence.
In one of the most detailed such analyses, Oldershaw v. DaVita
Healthcare Partners, Inc., District of Colorado Chief Judge Marcia S.
Krieger began by agreeing with Turner that “‘conditional
certification’ in a ‘collective action’ is somewhat of a misnomer,”
because it has a more limited purpose than Rule 23 class
“certification”: “[in] FLSA claims, ‘conditional certification’ is the
Id.
Id.
107 See, e.g., Beall v. SST Energy Corp., No. 15-cv-01741-MSK-NYW, 2016 WL 286295,
at *1-2, *1 n.1 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2016) (citing Turner and not expressly rejecting it, but still
requiring certification based upon proof employees are “similarly situated”); Beltran v.
InterExchange, Inc., No. 14-cv-03074-CMA-CBS, 2017 WL 4418684, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr.
28, 2017) (not citing Turner or any other authority proposing or rejecting reform proposals,
but citing Thiessen in granting certification and holding, “[c]ourts take a two-step approach
to certifying FLSA collective actions”).
105
106
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vehicle by which a court authorizes a named plaintiff to give a
Hoffmann-La Roche type of notice to other employees.”108 Yet
Oldershaw then, “[r]eflecting upon the teachings of Genesis, the
thoughts of other courts, and the writings of legal scholars” –
including Turner and Second-Class Class Action – held that a FLSA
collective action is an entirely non-representative action, simply a
lawsuit with many individual plaintiffs:
[A] named plaintiff in an FLSA action has no interest in the
“collective action” beyond her individual claim because no separate
legal entity is created. This is fundamentally different from a “class
action” in which certification creates a “plaintiff class” which is then
represented by the named plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel. In an
FLSA “collective action” every named and “opt-in” plaintiff pursues
his or her individual claim.109
From this conclusion that FLSA collective actions are not
“representative” actions at all, Oldershaw held individualized
discovery, trials, and settlement consent proper in FLSA collective
actions, because each plaintiff is “free to pursue his or her individual
claim[,] . . . choose his or her counsel, accept or reject a settlement
proposal, and decide to go to trial.”110 Following that explanation of
how FLSA opt-in creates individual plaintiffs, not representation by
named plaintiffs, Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang granted
Defendants permission to take “depositions of all opt-in plaintiffs” in
the case.111 Judge Wang’s order made clear that opt-ins face full
party discovery, as shown by how it required in-person depositions:
while courts have discretion to permit depositions by remote
means,112 each FLSA opt-in “is a Plaintiff in this action and proceeds
in this case on her own individual claim,” the decision noted, so their
depositions are not the sort of “‘fairly uncomplicated, largely non-

108

2017).

Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (D. Colo.

Id. at 1113-14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1115.
111 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., No. 15-cv-01964-MSK-NYW, 2018
WL 3329550, at *1 (D. Colo. July 6, 2018).
112 Id. at *2 (“The parties may stipulate, or the court upon motion may order, that a
deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4).”).
109
110
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controversial’” depositions that are most feasible to conduct
remotely.113

b. Requiring Individualized Rights Advisements and
Individualized Consent to a Collective Settlement.
In a subsequent case, the Oldershaw Court required that
“notice” detail varied rights that opt-ins hold as individual parties,
not members of a representative action:
[N]otice should describe the nature of the FLSA “collective
action,” the FLSA claim and remedies, and . . . the opportunity
to “opt-in”. . . . It should also advise recipients of their right to be
represented by counsel for the original plaintiff, to obtain
independent representation, or to participate pro se. It may also
describe certain rights of an “opt-in” plaintiff (including . . . not
to be bound by a settlement that the original plaintiff advocates).
It should explain that . . . the employee can pursue an
independent action . . . .114

Another decision appeared to take a stricter line on the need for
individualized settlement consent. Ruiz v. Act Fast Delivery of
Colorado Inc., while noting that “there could be circumstances in
which the nature or size of the opt-in group makes it impractical to
solicit and obtain universal consent before an action can be settled in
its entirety[,]” held that for a 73-member collective action, Plaintiffs’
counsel must “effectively inform each of the opt-in plaintiffs of the
nature and terms of the settlement and secure some manifestation of
each plaintiff’s consent.” 115

113 Id. at *3 (quoting Pappas v. Frank Azar & Assocs., P.C., No. 06-cv-01024-MSK-BNB,
2008 WL 920130, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 3, 2008)). Pappas actually says “relatively
uncomplicated, largely non-controversial,” No. 06-cv-01024-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 920130,
at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 3, 2008).
114 Johnson v. Colo. Seminary, No. 17-cv-02074-MSK-KMT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
221614, at *9 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2017) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Arfsten v. Cutters
Wireline Serv., No. 16-cv-01919-MSK-KMT, 2017 WL 2400489 (D. Colo. May 26, 2017)
(notice form with similar provisions).
115 No. 14-cv-00870-MSK-NYW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4821, at *16-17 (D. Colo. Jan. 9,
2017) (emphases added).
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c. Rejecting “Hybrid” Simultaneous Litigation of FLSA Wage
Claims under § 216(b) and State Wage Claims under Rule 23.
Having found that collective FLSA claims must proceed in a
fundamentally different way from state wage claims in a Rule 23
class, Oldershaw issued another holding that departed from the
weight of the prevailing authority: bifurcating the FLSA and state
wage claims, ordering adjudication of the FLSA first, because “this
Court is convinced that the differences between an FLSA ‘collective
action’ and a Rule 23 ‘class action’ make the simultaneous
consideration of both types of claims unworkable, inconvenient,
costly and potentially prejudicial to some employee plaintiffs.”116
Another roughly contemporaneous decision held the same – not
elaborating in depth as Oldershaw did, but issuing a more categorical
holding:
[T]his Court has adopted a practice of bifurcating “hybrid” cases,
such as this, that assert both FLSA collective actions and Rule
23 class actions invoking state wage claim laws. . . . [T]he Court
will adjudicate the FLSA claim . . . [to] final resolution before . .
. any aspect of the . . . Rule 23 class . . . .117

Yet Oldershaw’s rejection of hybrid class/collective wage actions
was a departure from prevailing practice. The more prevalent
practice, gradually adopted as FLSA litigation grew in the 2000s and
2010s, is allowing “hybrid” Rule 23 and § 216(b) wage litigation –
letting the same case include, and litigate simultaneously, a Rule 23
class for state wage claims (which automatically includes all within
the class definition) and a § 216(b) collective action for FLSA wage
claims (which includes only those who opt in). “The concept of
inherent incompatibility has not fared well at the appellate level” in
decisions on the propriety of hybrid class/collective wage actions, the
Third Circuit noted in becoming the fifth of the circuits to approve of
hybrid class/collective actions in Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp.118

116 Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114, 1118-19
(D. Colo. 2017).
117 Arfsten v. Cutters Wireline Serv., Inc., No. 16-cv-01919-MSK-KMT, 2017 WL
2400489, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. May 26, 2017) (emphasis added).
118 675 F.3d 249, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2012) (collecting decisions approving hybrid actions
from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits).
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Knepper adopted the following reasoning by the Seventh Circuit in
Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc.:
Although the potential for confusion created by a notice is a valid
case-management consideration . . . , there is no indication that
the problem is any worse than countless others . . . with class
actions.
It does not seem like too much to require potential participants
to make two binary choices: (1) . . . opt in and participate in the
federal action; (2) . . . opt out and not participate in the state-law
claims. . . . [C]ourts . . . have had little trouble working out an
adequate notice . . . . As a general rule, it will usually be
preferable if the notice comes from a single court, in a unified
proceeding, where the court and lawyers alike are paying close
attention to the overall message . . . .119

Even within its own jurisdiction, the Oldershaw rejection of
hybrid actions created a split as well. As another Court in the same
District noted, “recent cases arising in this District tend toward
approving ‘hybrid’ class actions,”120 making the Oldershaw rejection
of simultaneous collective/class hybrid litigation, like the Turner
rejection of “certification,” a cause of a split in the caselaw.
In sum, after recognizing how § 216(b) collective actions are less
like class actions and more like mass joinder than previously
recognized, these courts proceeded to hold that FLSA collective
actions are not representative actions at all.

119 Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2011) (allowing
hybrid action).
120 Valverde v. Xclusive Staffing, Inc., No. 16-v-00671-RM-MJW, 2017 WL 1386351, at
*12 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2017), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part,
2017 WL 3866769 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2017) (adopting portion that approved “hybrid”
litigation); see also, e.g., Avendano v. Averus, Inc., No. 14-cv-01614-CMA-MJW, Slip Op. at
7 (Dkt. #92, Sept. 29, 2016) (allowing hybrid litigation and noting, “the majority of federal
circuit courts of appeals have concluded that these so-called ‘hybrid’ actions are not
inherently incompatible”).
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III. FINDING THE BALANCE: FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AS
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS THAT REQUIRE LIMITED JUDICIAL
MANAGEMENT
A. The Broad Purpose of FLSA § 216(b): Collective and
Representative
Section 216(b) is a representative mechanism for adjudicating
FLSA wage rights. The starting point for determining its contours is
the FLSA language: it authorizes legal action “by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated,”121 with the opt-in provision focusing
on how individuals become represented, not whether they are
represented: “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party
and such consent is filed.”122 This core § 216(b) language shows
Congress intended more than a “mere joinder device.”123
The legislative history, while not extensive, confirms the
congressional intent that FLSA collective actions are representative
actions. The Congressional Record for the FLSA published the full
“Statement of John M. Keating,” an attorney invited and authorized
to speak for the United Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers
International Union. In section IV of his Statement, entitled, “The
Provision Permitting Suits Should Authorize Representative Actions
and Should Require Approval of the Board Until Such Time as Board
Permits Suits Without Permission,” Keating advocated “[permitting
employees or unions] to bring a representative action for the benefit
of all employees similarly situated. Such a provision would make the
act semi-self-enforcing and would stop 90 percent of chiseling.”124 He
elaborated further in answering the Chair of the Committee on
Labor:

29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
Id.
123 James M. Fraser, supra note 26, at 114.
124 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1937: JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. ON EDUC.
& LABOR U.S. S. & THE COMM. ON LABOR H.R. ON S. 2475 AND H.R. 7200,” 75th CONG. 457
(1937) (statement of John M. Keating).
121
122
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Representative Connery: One man representing all the
organized workers to do the suing?
Mr. Keating: Yes.
Representative Connery: Instead of one man simply suing a
small employer just to get it before the Supreme Court?
Mr. Keating: That is right.125

Based on both the language and legislative history, commentary
contemporaneous with the FLSA enactment recognized: “it is clear .
. . that Congress intended to avoid multiplicity of suits and joinder
difficulties by permitting a speedy and efficient determination of
employee rights in some group form of action,” and that § 216(b) is
“authority for group actions by employees independent of general
class action rules . . . to permit a more flexible and expeditious
procedure.”126
However, reconciling the two sentences of § 216(b) –
“representative” actions, but with “opt in” required – has generated
confusion. “While the first sentence sounds in representational terms
(. . . ‘on behalf of’ others ‘similarly situated’), the second sentence
refers to those who file consents as ‘party plaintiffs,’ seeming to imply
that all who affirmatively choose to become participants have an
equal, individual stake.”127 This tension traces to the extensive
amendment to § 216(b) in The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA),128
which, nine years after FLSA enactment, sought to rein in FLSA
suits by labor unions, as Hoffmann-La Roche later recounted: “In
part responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking
a personal interest . . . representative action by plaintiffs not
themselves possessing claims was abolished, and the requirement
that an employee file a written consent was added.”129

Id. at 461.
James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 37 ILL. L. REV. 119, 123, 132 (1942) (emphases added).
127 Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2016).
128 The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, 61 Stat. 8-85, § 1 (1948).
129 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989); see also Note, Fair
Labor Standards Under the Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 352, 360 (1948).
125
126
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Hoffmann-La Roche cited legislative history to illuminate the
intent of the 1947 PPA: to allow actions that employees file for each
other while disallowing only those “representative actions” in which
an agent, such as a labor union, sues for employees. Senator Donnell,
Chair of the drafting subcommittee, denounced the “representative
action . . . in which an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of
stirring up litigation without being an employee at all, is permitted
to be the plaintiff in the case.”130 Thus, the requirements that opt-in
plaintiffs file written consents to join and that suit can be brought
only by affected employees were added to § 216(b).
Interpreting collective actions as “representative” actions also
comports with the remedial nature of the FLSA, which Congress
enacted to redress unhealthy labor practices that it did not perceive
as one-offs: “It was reasonable to postulate that, if one employee was
suffering from excessive hours without overtime pay or pay below the
minimum wage, the employee’s situation was not isolated. More
likely, the employee was just one of numerous workers enduring
unfair conditions caused by a particular practice of the employer.”131
As an early FLSA decision noted, “[i]n addition to the necessity of a
liberal interpretation of the Act by reason of its remedial nature, the
Congress broadened the customary procedure of bringing claimants
before the court, evidently having in mind a simplification of court
procedure by bringing in claimants in groups.”132
It is thus in conformity with this statutory text, history, and
legislative purpose that Hoffmann-La Roche approved a role for
courts in supervising notice of FLSA rights to preserve potential optin plaintiffs’ rights against possible unawareness and the statute of
limitations.133 The Court held that concerns about case management,
not due process concerns, allow courts to review and authorize notice
to potential class members.134 It did not, as some commentators and

93 CONG. REC. 2,182 (1947).
Gates, supra note 10, at 1526.
132 Distelhorst v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 334, 335 (S.D. Iowa 1944).
133 493 U.S. 165, 165 (1989).
134 Id. at 171-72; see also Susan M. Coler et. al., Handling Class Actions Under the
ADEA, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP’ POL’Y J. 553, 573 (2006).
130
131
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courts have opined, deem “whether FLSA cases could proceed as
representative actions” an open question.135

B. Open Questions: What Courts Miss in FLSA Representative
Actions.
Even if § 216(b) FLSA collective actions are representative,
group suits, the parameters of that representation remain contested
and unclear. As one circuit noted, the § 216(b) language “raises more
questions than it provides answers,”136 a void that early missteps in
the case law filled poorly by requiring “certification” as under Rule
23.137 Yet eliminating unnecessary “certification” processes does not
resolve all ambiguities in how to litigate or adjudicate collective
actions.
First, questions arise as to complaint sufficiency. To plead an
FLSA collective action under § 216(b), the named plaintiffs must
sufficiently allege that other employees are similarly situated. If
plaintiffs do not request that the litigation be “conditionally certified”
or that notice be sent to other employees of their right to join (as
authorized by Hoffmann La-Roche), defendants have taken upon
themselves to move to dismiss the collective action allegations.138
What is the court’s role in determining “similarly situated” early in
the case? Under Rule 20 joinder, one common issue is enough “glue”
to allow permissive joinder;139 in § 216(b) cases, should the same
substantive standard apply, and when should this be analyzed—only
after a defendant moves to dismiss, at summary judgment, or at
some other time? How should courts redress concerns that defendant
employers might face group action that includes employees that are
not similar enough, and employees may have claims too dissimilar to
be litigated together properly?
135 Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a
Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2008).
136 Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2016).
137 Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 533–34.
138 See, e.g., McGlathery v. Lincare, Inc., No. 8:13–cv–1255–T–23TBM, 2014 WL
1338610, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2014) (dismissing opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice after
plaintiffs failed to move for conditional certification by deadline); Quijano v. Tuffy Assocs.,
No. 2:13–cv–573–FTM–38CM, 2014 WL 4182691, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (same).
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 20; see Second-Class Class Action, supra note 4, at 543-44.
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Second, the issue of notice to other similar employees needs
resolution. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hoffmann La-Roche,
notice to similarly-situated employees is especially important in the
FLSA context where the two-year statute of limitations continues to
run until affected employees join the suit by written consent.140
Notice is critical to protect wage rights, particularly in cases
involving large numbers of employees for corporate employers. If
conditional certification is not required, how should plaintiffs
effectuate notice sent to other potentially affected employees? Courtauthorized notice, as sanctioned by the Hoffmann La-Roche Court,
needs to be provided as soon as practicable.141 Without conditional
certification, how and when should judicial approval be sought to
preserve those rights? And what should courts require in the notice
– a simple alert of the right to join a suit for unpaid wages, or a more
detailed list of individual party rights?142
Third, courts struggle with settlement of FLSA collective actions
without certification. In the eyes of defendant employers, the goal of
settlement is to fully and finally satisfy the wage claims of all affected
employees. Without counsel certified as representing all opt-in
plaintiffs, how do parties execute a global settlement? If opt-in
plaintiffs are party plaintiffs, do plaintiffs’ counsel need written
consent of each one to settle their claims?143 If so, that might be
difficult if the number of affected workers number in the thousands,
as in Turner v. Chipotle itself.144 And if courts have no inherent
“judicial gatekeeping” role over all FLSA collective actions, under
what circumstances, if any, do courts scrutinize the substance (i.e.,
fairness and reasonableness) of a FLSA settlement?145
Lastly, litigation management of FLSA collective actions
without conditional certification needs clarification. If opt-in
plaintiffs are not represented by the interests of the named plaintiffs
in FLSA collective actions, then do they need to participate fully in
all litigation decisions? In discovery, must each opt-in plaintiff
participate in all requests and fact finding, such as individually
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1989).
Id. at 171.
142 See supra Part II(B)(3)(b) (discussing cases requiring different forms of notice).
143 See supra Part II(B)(3)(b) (discussing cases requiring individualized consent).
144 Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1309-10 (D. Colo. 2015).
145 See infra Part IV(C)(5)(a) (discussing mixed cases on court review of FLSA
settlements).
140
141
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respond to all interrogatories and document requests, and sit for
deposition? Must all testify at trial? The inefficiencies of having
multiple similar workers is magnified as the number of affected
workers grows into the hundreds and thousands. One of efficiencies
of representative discovery is having a statistically significant
sample of plaintiffs, who have similar claims and facts, represent the
group in liability determinations. Where opt-in plaintiffs are full
party plaintiffs, how does discovery and testimony proceed when only
a fraction of actual parties participates?
Because these questions regularly confound parties, and plague
courts struggling with qualms about the traditional FLSA
certification process – or courts with cases in which plaintiffs never
seek notice, and thus never put the “certification” issue before the
court – the next section offers our recommendations: a set of best
practices for litigating and adjudicating collective actions. The
suggestions aim to strike a balance between multiple goals:
respecting the nature of § 216(b) wage cases as representative
actions; yet also respecting parties’ rights to press individual
arguments and make individual decisions; and while striking that
balance, not overburdening courts and parties alike.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LITIGATING AND ADJUDICATING
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS – WITHOUT MIS-APPLYING CLASS ACTION
RULES,
BUT WITHOUT DENYING THEIR REPRESENTATIVE NATURE.
Class actions have well-defined rules and practices, serving
different purposes for those on all sides of the case:
• for plaintiffs and their class counsel, facilitating class-wide
adjudication of sufficiently similar claims, and assuring
equitable and ethical representation of absent class members;
• for defendants, assuring fair opportunity to challenge the
class propriety, to press for discovery and trial procedures that
protect their rights, and to achieve as much closure as possible
by extending settlement to as many workers as possible; and
• for the court, enhancing judicial powers to enforce the above
rights and obligations on both sides – by deciding whether a
class is proper and (if so) structuring discovery and trial to suit
the case, by retaining power over matters normally left to
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parties such as choosing counsel and settlement terms, and by
monitoring both sides’ ethics compliance.

If § 216(b) collective actions are less like Rule 23 class actions
than is often recognized, then these established class action rules and
practices do not apply identically to collective actions. But if § 216(b)
collective actions are still representative actions, not pure individual
actions in which the court remains largely hands-off and each
plaintiff is a full participant in all stages – depositions, paper
discovery, and trial testimony – then courts need some set of rules
and practices different from the basic ways that cases with one or
just a few plaintiffs are litigated.
In short, neither fully applying class action rules nor ignoring
the representative nature of the case comports with how a § 216(b)
collective action is a representative action, but not a class action.
Accordingly, this section details what we see as sensible rules and
practices that parties and courts could apply – within the scope of
existing law – to § 216(b) collective actions: for plaintiffs and class
counsel (subpart (A) infra); for defendants (subpart (B); and for
courts (subpart (C)).

A. Plaintiffs’ Options: Collective Actions May Have CourtAuthorized Notice, or May Remain Party-Managed.
1. A Motion for Court-Approved Notice Is Optional, and Not a
“Certification” Motion – and If Plaintiffs File No Motion,
Solicitation of Opt-In Plaintiffs Remains Proper.
Notice is no technicality; it is the one collective action procedure
the Supreme Court has approved,146 and an important part of any
case too large to assume potential plaintiffs can learn of their rights
and contact plaintiffs’ attorneys. Notifying workers that they can join
an existing suit pressing the same claims, and that their rights may
expire if they do not sue, can serve both fairness (assuring similar
individuals enjoy similar rights) and efficiency (avoiding redundant
similar lawsuits).147
But because a motion for court-authorized notice is not seeking
anything for the existing plaintiffs – the original plaintiff(s) plus
146
147

See generally Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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anyone opting in without notice – a denial of the motion is simply a
court decision not to authorize notice to additional potential
plaintiffs; it is no “decertification.” To challenge the effort by the
plaintiffs (those who filed suit and those who opted in) to litigate
their claims together rather than in separate lawsuits, a defendant
may move for a ruling that some or all of those plaintiffs are
misjoined, as in any multiple-plaintiff case, as detailed below.148

2. A Party-Managed Collective Action with Permissive Opt-In
Remains Proper If Court-Approved Notice Is Rejected or Not
Sought.
The difference between an order rejecting certification (as is
common practice) and an order rejecting just notice (as we now
suggest) is not just semantics. Until and unless a misjoinder motion
is granted, after an order rejecting notice, the case still may proceed
as what we would call a “party-managed collective action” – i.e., a
collective action without a court-approved invitation for all potential
plaintiffs to join. Even courts entering orders decertifying collective
actions still allow parties to keep litigating their joinder-based
collective actions, just without any further prospect of courtauthorized notice or other potential benefits of the court agreeing
that all opt-ins are properly part of the case.149
The key reason party-managed class actions can proceed when
a court rejects notice is that § 216(b) does not require the sort of
broad-based invitation to join that notice constitutes. Unlike Rule 23,
§ 216(b) permits, but does not mandate, litigating for other similar
individuals. For damages class actions, under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) the
court “must” notify all within “the definition of the class” that they
are included in the class, can be represented by a different attorney,
See infra Part IV(B).
Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1386 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding,
after denial of certification of age discrimination action governed by § 216(b) opt-in process,
that “members are not ‘irreparably harmed’ by a denial of class certification, because they
may still intervene in the ongoing action or file their own suits”); Dixon v. Scott Fetzer Co.,
317 F.R.D. 329, 331-32 (D. Conn. 2016) (after decertification of collective action, allowing
joinder of 130 individuals, then 28 more, then three more, because “[a]lthough the Court
has determined that these inquiries will be individualized—such that the case may not
proceed as a collective action . . .… — judicial economy still warrant[s] resolving these
issues in a single lawsuit”).
148
149
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and are bound by the case outcome unless they opt out.150 Section
216(b) does none of these things; it neither mandates notice nor
requires inclusion of others with similar claims. The relevant two
sentences of § 216(b) provide only permission for the original
plaintiffs to allow others to join: a lawsuit “may be maintained . . . by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated”; and “[n]o employee shall be
a party plaintiff . . . unless he gives his consent in writing.”151
Thus, FLSA lawsuits with just a subset of all potential plaintiffs
are common, with no argument that all similar workers must be
invited to join. One early FLSA case rejected the dismissal argument
“that the plaintiffs, Townsend and Yancey, were not authorized by
all of the ‘red caps’’ to bring this action” – because (a) “it is not
essential . . . [to] receive authority from every person” similarly
situated, and (b) “all persons who are alleged in the complaint to be
similarly situated . . . are not indispensable parties” the suit must
include.152 That joinder is permissive, not mandatory, is restated
only rarely,153 because it is taken as a given – but it is a key premise
of the many FLSA decisions, since the 1940s, that set a pretrial
joinder deadline, after which similarly situated workers cannot
join.154
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (emphases added).
152 Townsend v. Boston & M.R.R., 35 F. Supp. 938, 940 (D. Mass. 1940); see also Hunt
v. Nat’’l Linen Serv. Corp., 157 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tenn. 1941) (“[T]his action may be begun
by and for one employee primarily, but may include within its scope a claim for all other
employees similarly situated. This would not necessarily mean that these other employees
were parties to the litigation.”) (emphasis added).
153 See, e.g., Nerland v. Caribou Coffee Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031 (D. Minn. 2007)
(noting that collective action may proceed without all potential members joining, as
justification for state-law Rule 23 class: “[J]oinder of all possible state class plaintiffs has
not necessarily occurred through the FLSA collective action . . . . There exists the possibility
that some current store managers did not opt into the FLSA action for fear of retaliation .
. . .”).
154 See, e.g., Dixon v. Scott Fetzer Co., 317 F.R.D. 329, 333 (D. Conn. 2016) (setting
deadline after summary judgment was denied, but before trial, for others to join); Michigan
Supervisors’ Union v. Dep’t of Corr., 826 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (“[N]o more
plaintiffs will be allowed to join the class after this Court signs its opinions on the issue of
damages and the motion to alter or amend.”); Deaton v. Titusville Bldg. Corp., 72 F. Supp.
986, 986–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (limiting opt-in period to just under 11 months after complaint
filing date); Barrett v. Nat’l Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416-17 (W.D.
Pa. 1946) (barring joinder after pretrial deadline; while “[a]ctions of this nature, …
150
151
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While inviting all with similar claims can serve fairness and
efficiency, it may be a reasonable decision not to invite all. Not every
lawyer representing workers has the money or staff to litigate a
nationwide case;155 many could litigate a wage case for only a modest
number of clients in one case. Unlike Rule 23 class counsel, a lawyer
litigating a § 216(b) wage case for a limited range of plaintiffs has no
duty to potential plaintiffs – only to those who filed as plaintiffs or
opted in.
When plaintiffs decline to seek court-approved notice, they still
can send notice, just not a notice whose persuasiveness is bolstered
by court approval. The ethics rule on solicitation, ABA Model Rule
7.3,156 contrary to some perceptions, is not a blanket ban on targeted
mailings soliciting potential clients:
• Rule 7.3(a) bars solicitation only by “in‑person, live
telephone or real-time electronic contact”;
• Rules 7.3(b) – 7.3(c) bar “written, recorded or electronic
communication” solicitation only when the recipient already
indicated “a desire not to be solicited” ((b)(1)), “the solicitation
involves coercion, duress or harassment” ((b)(2)), or “aris[ing]
out of the personal injury or death of any person”;
• Rule 7.3(d) then allows other “written, recorded or electronic
communication from a lawyer soliciting professional
employment,” as long as it bears the words “Advertising
Material.”157

commonly termed ‘representative suits,’’ should be liberally administered since it may be
that other persons interested in the same common question . . . might desire to join as party
plaintiffs,” it still “does not appear fair to the Court that the defendant should be ‘left in the
dark’ as to what claims it might be called upon to answer. . .”).
155 See, e.g., Saleen v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 08-4959 (PJS/JJK), 2009 WL 1664451, at
*8–9 (D. Minn. June 15, 2009), aff’d, 649 F. Supp. 2d 937 (D. Minn. 2009) (noting that
plaintiffs seek substantial increase to “the size and expense of this case by issuing courtfacilitated notice to all 30,000 potential opt-ins identified,” and more specifically, “the
expense of sending out notice to the putative collective members, the substantial widening
of discovery, and the burden . . . of administering the thousands of claims brought by optins nationwide”).
156 States have widely adopted ABA Model Rule 7.3. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N). See, e.g., Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.3.
157 MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N).’
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Accordingly, as long as a notice from collective action plaintiffs’
counsel is a non-real-time writing – such as a letter, an email, or an
online or social media post – it is permissible, not barred, solicitation.
The significant caveat is that if plaintiffs do file a motion for notice
that the court rejects – or if the Court grants a defense “misjoinder”
motion – then it may not remain proper for counsel to send a notice
telling individuals that they can join the case. Whether any court
decision precludes notice depends, however, on how the court decides
any notice, misjoinder, or other motions – as detailed in Part (C)
below.
More broadly, whether plaintiffs obtain court-authorized notice
or proceed with a party-managed collective action does not much
change the rights and responsibilities of defendants and courts: (1)
defendants’ rights to challenge the joinder (at least in cases with
more than one plaintiff) of the plaintiffs into one action (infra Part
B); and the court’s duties, especially in larger collective actions in
which attorney-client communication and joint adjudication are
trickier, to assure that representative procedures are fair to
defendants and that decisions by plaintiffs’ counsel treat their clients
equitably (infra Part C).

B. Defendants’ Options: Dismissal and Misjoinder Motions –
Depending on Their Strategy and Case Assessment.
It might be efficient for a defendant to move for a finding of
misjoinder contemporaneously with, or as a cross-motion merged
with, a plaintiff’s motion for notice. But in a no-certification world in
which plaintiffs may never file such a motion, that absence would not
deprive defendants of their rights to challenge the substance and the
procedure of allegations that numerous workers have similar unpaid
wage claims. After all, defendants in non-class/non-collective actions
have the right to so challenge, through various means.

1. Dispositive Motions.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can
dispose of claims that are facially or legally inadequate – including
some FLSA claims, those resolvable by applying legal analysis to
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undisputed facts.158 However, often in class and collective actions,
the parties cannot fully assess the viability of the claims until limited
preliminary discovery after the complaint and answer.159 A motion
after such discovery cannot be a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, because “a post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion
is untimely”.160 Yet defendants still have options when then conclude
only after preliminary discovery that a claim can be dismissed on
motion. Rule 12(b)(6) is a specific vehicle for arguing the defense of
failure to state a claim, but “according to Rule 12(h)(2) the defense is
preserved and may be raised as late as trial” – so, post-answer,
defendants still can seek dismissal for failure to state a claim, though
“some other vehicle, such as a motion for judgment on the pleadings
or for summary judgment, must be used to challenge the plaintiff’s
failure to state a claim.”161
Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions, however, are proper only where
a motion seeks to dismiss an entire claim, not where a motion targets
particular allegations – such as allegations that workers are
similarly situated enough for their FLSA claims to be litigated
together. Thus, courts have rejected 12(b)(6) motions for “partial
dismissal” that argue against only the “class allegations,” not that all
class members fail to state a claim162 – case law that applies equally
to 12(c) motions, because they apply the same standards as 12(b)(6)
motions.163
158 E.g., Fernandez v. Zoni Language Ctrs., Inc., 858 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 2017)
(affirming grant of Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss FLSA claim against for-profit entities
teaching English as a second language, because undisputed nature of defendant’s business
showed that it qualified for the FLSA exemption for “educational establishments”).
159 E.g., Herrera v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’shp, 648 F. App’x 930, 936–37 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he district court should have allowed limited discovery instead of striking the class
allegations based solely on the face of the complaint. … [W]e reverse the district court’s
decision to strike the class allegations . . . .”).
160 5B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 (3d ed. & 2018 update).
161 5B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 (3d ed. & 2018 update).
162 See, e.g., Rosales v. FitFlop USA, LLC, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
(denying motion for partial dismissal of only the class allegations on sex discrimination
claims); Whittaker v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 86 F.R.D. 689, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(denying Rule 12 motion to strike class allegations, deeming such issues properly addressed
in motion for class certification).
163 See, e.g., Sanchez v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 870 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Rule
12(c) … appl[ies] the same standards that apply to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.”); Engler v.
Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2017) (“To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the
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The Rule 12 case law against disposing of less than a full claim
does not apply to summary judgment, however. Under Rule 56(a), a
motion for summary judgment can attack only “part of [a] claim”;164
under Rule 56(g), a decision on summary judgment that “does not
grant all the relief requested by the motion” still “may enter an order
stating any material fact … that is not genuinely in dispute.”165 Thus,
after some or all discovery, defendants can seek partial summary
judgment as to particular issues related to employees’ claims166 –
such as whether employees are similarly situated enough for their
claims to be litigated jointly.

2. Misjoinder Motions.
With Rule 12 a poor vehicle for attacking class allegations, and
Rule 56 motions often unavailable until sufficient discovery has
passed, defendants’ best vehicle for challenging the propriety of a
collective action often will be a misjoinder motion under Rule 21,
which provides as follows:
Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action.
On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms,
add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.167
‘“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”‘”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
164 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
165 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g).
166 See, e.g, Alberty-Vélez v. Corporación De Puerto Rico Para La Difusión Pública, 242
F.3d 418, 422 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing trial judgment that contravened earlier grant of
partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s status as employee or contractor, because district
court’s earlier “determination that Alberty was an employee was an entry of partial
summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). Facts specified in such circumstances
‘shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.’”) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56); First Nat. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 977 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“FDIC
objects to this motion, arguing that First National is seeking rulings on individual issues
without seeking summary judgment as to an entire cause of action. Rule 56(d), however,
provides that if a motion for summary judgment will not dispose of the whole case, the
Court ‘shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.’ Even if
First National will not prevail on one of its causes of action, the Court may still grant
summary adjudication as to specific issues if it will narrow the issues for trial.” (citation
omitted)).
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
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The “at any” time portion of Rule 21 distinguishes it from the
main dispositive motions, both motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim (which can be filed only at the start of a case) and motions for
summary judgment (which can be granted only after adequate
discovery).168 Misjoinder motions can be made up to and even after
trial,169 subject to the important proviso that such a motion will not
be granted if it would unfairly prejudice any party.170
Thus, whether and when to file a misjoinder motion is up to the
defendant, subject only to the confines of the scheduling order. Rule
16 already provides that “the district judge . . . must issue a
scheduling order” early in litigation.171 Scheduling orders can cover
any number of matters, but the “required contents” already include
changes to pleadings and motions: “The scheduling order must limit
the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete
discovery, and file motions.”172 District courts’ deadline-setting
authority is strong; applying the deferential “abuse of discretion”
review standard, appellate courts regularly affirm district court
decisions denying motions as untimely, without even addressing the
merits, when such motions are filed after a deadline in a scheduling
order.173

See supra note 167.
See, e.g., Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. Avalon Corr. Servs., 651 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.
2011) (“[A] district court can dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 21 to cure a jurisdictional defect at any point . . . , including after judgment . . . .
[T]he district court . . . attempted to invoke this exception to the time-of-filing rule in
fashioning its severance and dismissal order . . . to preserve the investment of resources by
the court and the parties.”).
170 E.g., Atwood v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D. Or. 1977), aff’d, 657 F.2d
1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[I]t would be unfairly prejudicial to dismiss the Union at this stage .
. . . [I]t is simply unfair to expect the Employers to litigate and defend the Union against
plaintiffs’ claim of unfair representation. The Union has best access to the appropriate
witnesses and evidence . . . . While the Employers certainly have an interest in this issue
and may participate in its trial, they should not be required to assume sole responsibility—
especially in view of the relative longevity of this action . . . . [T]he Employers have relied
upon the presence of the Union in this case.”).
171 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1).
172 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A).
173 See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 485 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of
motion for judgment on pleadings that had argued Defendants enjoyed qualified immunity,
but was filed weeks after deadline for motions in scheduling order: “[T]he district court did
not reach the merits but, rather, disposed of the motion as a matter of case management.
168
169
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C. The Court’s Powers and Role: Creative Case Management;
Authorizing Notice; and Limited Supervision of Settlements and
Dismissal Decisions.
Even without the cumbersome two-stage “certification” process,
courts retain more powers in collective actions than in individual
litigation. Below we detail several such powers, and the feasibility of
our, or others’ similar, suggestions are our answer to the caselaw
deeming “hybrid” Rule 23 state wage class and § 216(b) federal wage
collective actions “unworkable, inconvenient, costly and potentially
prejudicial.”174 If the court powers and roles we suggest are feasible,
that tilts the scale in favor finding hybrid actions feasible – or at
least, as the Seventh Circuit noted, no less feasible than the
alternatives, because “[a]lthough the potential for confusion created
by a notice is a valid case-management consideration . . . , there is no
indication that the problem is any worse than countless others . . .
with class actions,” and any such confusion likely will be ameliorated,
not worsened, “if the notice comes from a single court, in a unified
proceeding, where the court and lawyers alike are paying close
attention to the overall message.”175

1. Denial of a Motion for Notice.
While the rules of professional responsibility permit plaintiffs’
counsel to send a private notice (i.e., non-court-approved notice) to
potential plaintiffs, private notice may not be proper if plaintiffs
moved for notice and the court denied the motion. Whether a court
denial of notice precludes private notice depends on what the court
actually determined. A denial of notice may base on an express
finding that the individuals who might join are not actually similarly
situated – which would preclude any later effort to join that is
contrary to such a ruling.
Yet a denial of notice may not include findings on whether
actual or potential plaintiffs are or are not similarly situated. The
court may deny notice because it deems that (a) a “similarly situated”
Thus, a different standard of review obtains: we examine challenged case-management
orders solely for abuse of discretion.”).
174 Oldershaw v, Davita Healthcare Partners, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (D. Colo.
2017) (disallowing hybrid action).
175 Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., 632 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2011) (allowing hybrid action).

70

FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:1

finding is premature, requiring more discovery, or (b) notice is an
unnecessary use of court discretion, because potential plaintiffs have
been adequately informed already. Thus, courts should clarify, in any
ruling on notice, whether it is actually deciding the “similarly
situated” issue.
The presumption, though, should be that, unless a defendant
has simultaneously made a misjoinder motion, a motion for notice
ordinarily will not preclude later joinder. The motion seeks just
notice, not joinder of specific plaintiffs, so it ordinarily will not
present a full range of evidence as to all those who may join. If a
defendant wants to put before the court the issue of whose joinder is
or is not proper, it can make a misjoinder motion, the vehicle that
properly seeks such a ruling. If the court wishes to examine the issue
without a motion, it can do so sua sponte, because Rule 21 permits a
court to drop or sever a party “[o]n motion or on its own,”176 placing
it in the same position as if a defendant had initiated a misjoinder
motion.177

2. A Finding of Misjoinder, with Protections for Severed
Plaintiffs.
a. The Effect of a Finding of Misjoinder.
The effect of a misjoinder finding is a matter of court discretion,
subject to two Rule 21 provisos: “Misjoinder of parties is not a ground
for dismissing an action”; and any misjoinder order must be “on just
terms.”178 “To remedy misjoinder, then, a court may not simply
dismiss a suit altogether. Instead, the court has two remedial
options: (1) misjoined parties may be dropped ‘on such terms as are
FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
See, e.g., Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(“Plaintiff’s death and his attorney’s subsequent failure to substitute his Estate as Plaintiff
do not warrant dismissal . . . . [T]he Court hereby resolves the issue under Rule 21 by
ordering that Mr. Boyd’s Estate be substituted as Plaintiff.”); Davis v. Fulton Cty., 884 F.
Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (“[A]ll of the claims . . . relate exclusively to the harms
allegedly suffered by Mrs. Bobby Davis …. [N]one of these alleged harms afford Mr. Davis
a cause of action . . . . [T]he Court must conclude that he has been improperly designated
as a plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will sua sponte terminate Mr. Davis’ status as a
plaintiff in this action.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 21; other citations omitted), aff’d, 90 F.3d
1346 (8th Cir. 1996).
178 FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
176
177
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just’; or (2) . . . misjoined parties ‘may be severed and proceeded with
separately.’”179
The strongly preferred option for misjoined claims is severing
into separate actions, not dismissing. Even though a dismissal would
be without prejudice (because it would not be a merits ruling), a
dismissal could injure dropped parties by rendering their re-filed
claims untimely – which would violate the “on just terms” proviso of
Rule 21, as one multiple courts of appeal have explained:
[It was] improper for the Court to choose dismissal instead, as
this misjoinder remedy would have imposed adverse statute-oflimitations consequences on [plaintiff]. Although a district court
has discretion to choose either severance or dismissal in
remedying misjoinder, it is permitted under Rule 21 to opt for
the latter only if “just”—that is, if doing so “will not prejudice
any substantial right.” . . .
This principle was recognized by . . . Elmore v. Henderson. That
case . . . involved a district court judge’s decision to . . . dismiss—
rather than sever— . . . under Rule 21 to remedy misjoinder. The
judge subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s separately filed
complaint as untimely because it was filed outside of the statuteof-limitations period. The Seventh Circuit held that . . . ‘[I]n
formulating a remedy for a misjoinder[,] the judge is required to
avoid gratuitous harm to the parties,’ and is therefore ‘dutybound’ to prevent a dismissal that would have adverse ‘statute
[-]of[-]limitations consequences.’ The district court instead
should have severed the claim and allowed it ‘to continue as a
separate suit so that it would not be time-barred’ rather than
dropping and dismissing the claim.
We follow suit and hold that the discretion to drop and dismiss
claims against misjoined defendants under Rule 21 is abated
when it ‘prejudic[es] any substantial right’ of plaintiffs, which
includes loss of otherwise timely claims if new suits are blocked
by statutes of limitations.180

DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 21).
Id. at 846-47 (alterations in original) (citing Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009,
1011 (7th Cir. 2000)) (alterations in original) (other citations omitted).
179
180
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b. Measures to Protect Rights of Misjoined Plaintiffs.
Any misjoinder should protect the rights of opt-in plaintiffs who,
often through no fault of their own, were invited to join an existing
lawsuit with claims that should have remained separate. Thus, a
court finding misjoinder would optimally clarify what the court is
actually ruling, and optimally protect all parties, by exploiting the
“on just terms” provision of Rule 21 to require specific actions, such
as the following: that the severance (or dismissal) will not take effect
until 30 days from the order, during which time plaintiffs’ counsel
must notify any plaintiffs who are deemed misjoined (a) of the nature
and effect of the court’s decision (e.g., whether their claims were
dismissed and must be refiled, or whether they were simply severed
into a separate, still-pending case}, (b) that if their claims were
severed, they will need to participate in the severed action
personally, not by simply continuing to rely on the initial collective
action named plaintiffs, and (c) that if their claims were dismissed,
they will need to file a complaint of their own within the 30 days to
avoid losing any portion of their limitations period.
Plaintiffs’ counsel presumptively still can represent severed
plaintiffs, absent a conflict of interest rising to the level that
professional responsibility rules deem presumptively impermissible:
Unless all affected clients consent . . . , a lawyer in civil litigation
may not: . . . represent two or more clients in a matter if there is
a substantial risk that . . . representation of one client would be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s duties to
another client in the matter.181
The feared “substantial risk” need not be plaintiffs having actual
claims against each other; it can be plaintiffs who, “although
nominally on the same side of a lawsuit, in fact have such
different interests that representation of one will have a
material and adverse effect on the lawyer’s representation of the
other” – which, the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers
notes, “can occur whether the clients are aligned as co-plaintiffs
. . . , as well as in complex and multiparty litigation.182

181
182

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000).
Id. § 128 cmt. d (2000).
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However,”[n]ot all possibly differing interests of co-clients in
complex and multiparty litigation involve material interests creating
conflict.”183 For example, “differences within the class over what
remedy is appropriate” is not a conflict precluding joint
representation,184 but if “co-claimants might wish to characterize the
facts differently,” that could be a conflict if it goes to the core of what
each is arguing.185 The Restatement offers a sensible but generalized
list of factors beyond the extent of the conflict: “whether (1) issues
common to the clients’ interests predominate, (2) circumstances such
as the size of each client’s interest make separate representation
impracticable, and (3) the extent of active judicial supervision of the
representation.”186
The class action case law offers more specifics on when different
views among many plaintiffs creates too much conflict of interest for
the same lawyer to represent all. Rule 23 requires the court to find
that the representative parties and class counsel will fairly and
adequately serve the interests of the class.187 The class action case
law parallels how the Restatement looks to not just whether a
conflict is possible, but whether there is “a substantial risk that the
lawyer’s representation of one client would be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer’s duties to another client.”188 For
example, assume a collective action against a retailer is severed
because the FLSA claims of two groups had little in common: hourly
staff (cashiers, salespeople, etc.) allegedly assigned off-the-clock
hours; and supervisors allegedly misclassified as overtime-exempt.
In such a case, attorneys for workers could not simultaneously
represent supervisors involved in the alleged violations against the
workers.189 But even under Rule 23, which gives courts more power
Id. § 128 cmt. d(iii) (2000).
Id. § 128 cmt. d(iii) (2000).
185 Id. § 128 cmt. d(i) (2000).
186 Id. § 128 cmt. d(iii) (2000).
187 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring for represented party); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4)
(same, class counsel).
188 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000).
189 This rule is commonly applied in Rule 23 employment class actions. See, e.g., Moore
v. Napolitano, 269 F.R.D. 21, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that Rule 23 employment
discrimination class’s “representation as proposed is inadequate” due to “conflicts of
interests” where class included supervisors who “participat[ed] in the discriminatory
conduct” against non-supervisory plaintiffs); Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 269 (D.
183
184
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to find a broad class improper due to conflicting interests, “only a
conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will
defeat a party’s claim of representative status.”190
Thus, workers and supervisors often can be represented in the
same class, despite the possibility that some equitable relief might
grant rights to workers by decreasing supervisors’ powers, because
“not all conflicts are fatal to certification, only those that are
fundamental and actual rather than hypothetical or speculative,”
and the supervisors had the same “desire to end any discrimination”
at the employer that workers did.191 More broadly, there is no
impermissible conflict just because relief can be zero-sum among
employment plaintiffs seeking similar rights and pay from the same
source, absent specific evidence that such “tension” among plaintiffs
actually “play[s] any role in the current litigation.”192 If conflicts grow
from a hypothetical to a substantial prospect, the court then can
require different counsel for each of two or more groups with
conflicting interests.193
Absent a conflict, severed plaintiffs still can retain collective
action plaintiffs’ counsel for their separate cases. Under current
practice, the opt-in form sent by plaintiffs’ counsel may contain an

Md. 2004) (finding “multiple conflicts,” including that some plaintiffs “were managers in
[Defendant’s] human resources division. . . . [who] handled the discrimination complaints
of other . . . Plaintiffs,” making it “probable that . . . class counsel may be forced to crossexamine their own clients . . . based on statements . . . and actions they took on
[Defendant’s] behalf.”); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 482-83 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (holding that two subsets of employees seeking potentially conflicting relief is
“sufficient to create concern on the part of [some] members . . . that counsel may not be
pursuing their interests as rigorously,” and “[o]ne possible remedy” is “retention of new
class counsel by either” of the two subsets), aff’d, 370 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004).
190 WRIGHT ET AL., 7A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1768 (3d ed. & 2018 update).
191 Latino Officers Ass’n v. City of New York, 209 F.R.D. 79, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
192 Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding no
inherent conflict in potential tension between plaintiffs seeking the right to take pregnancy
leave and plaintiffs whose pay might be decreased if other employees took such leave).
193 Latino Officers Ass’n v. City of New York, 209 F.R.D. 79, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding
conflict merely hypothetical, but noting that “[i]f an actual conflict develops, the Court is
prepared to revisit this question and consider certifying a separate subclass for each rank”);
Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 482-83 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding that
where there was conflict between two groups of plaintiffs, “[o]ne possible remedy for this
situation would be the retention of new class counsel by either” of the two subsets), aff’d,
370 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004).
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express agreement that the opt-in plaintiff is retaining them.194 But
sometimes they do not, and other times the bare-bones language in
an opt-in form leaves many ambiguities as to counsel’s authority and
client’s rights.195 Ultimately, the question is mainly what attorney
and client agree, not what any court orders, with one possible
exception: a court issuing an order of severance could, and likely
should, instruct collective action plaintiffs’ counsel to inform severed
plaintiffs whether or not they still represent them, and (a) if they do
represent them, what if any additional measures are needed to
protect their rights (e.g., working with counsel to file a new
complaint), but (b) if they do not represent them, that they will
provide new counsel (or pro se plaintiffs) all necessary files to assure
no prejudicial delay in clients’ continued pursuit of their rights.
For plaintiffs severed from a collective, proceeding separately
may or may not require a new complaint, depending on whether
severed plaintiffs actually allege different facts and argue different
legal interpretations. If plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice,
not than severed, they definitely need a new complaint. Either way,
the new complaint need not be as burdensome to write as the initial
collective complaint was. Plaintiffs can incorporate by reference the
original complaint, or whatever parts apply to them, under Rule 10:
“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere
in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.”196 As a
leading treatise notes, “[t]he ability to incorporate matter from other
pleadings is especially useful in multiparty litigation when the
presence of common questions often results in the pleadings of the
parties . . . being virtually identical, which makes . . . simple
incorporations by reference highly desirable.”197
In many cases, each plaintiff could file a 2-3 page complaint
saying which numbered allegations in the original complaint s/he
adopts – e.g., adopting all allegations except those about other
plaintiffs or the scope of the collective. Each complaint would need to
add only limited individual fact allegations, because FLSA claims are
governed by not the Rule 9 “particularity” requirement, but the Rule
194
195
196
197

See supra notes 311-314 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 311-314 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P 10(c).
WRIGHT ET AL., 5A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1326 (3d ed. & 2018 update).
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8 requirement of mere “notice pleading” – “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”198 While
often entailing complexity in procedural issues or evidence analysis
(e.g., analyzing voluminous time records), FLSA claims do not
require much pleading detail to state a claim, because “[u]nlike the
complex antitrust scheme at issue in Twombly that required
allegations of an agreement suggesting conspiracy, the requirements
to state a claim of a FLSA violation are quite straightforward.”199
Thus, if plaintiffs plead simply “that overtime hours were worked but
overtime wages were not received, [that] sufficiently ‘state[s] a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,’” so they need not plead the
specific number of hours, nor the quantity of pay owed.200

3. How Much to Keep Consolidated: Trial versus Pretrial.
As noted above, in some cases, plaintiffs’ claims are similar
enough for a collective trial, while in others, they are dissimilar
enough to sever early in the case. Yet many cases are in the middle:
the claims are partially similar enough to consolidated pretrial, but
not trial. Consolidated pretrial may be appropriate even if plaintiffs’
claims are only partially similar; even differing claims may require
many of the same depositions (regional managers who supervised
many plaintiffs, human resources officials involved in company-wide
policy, etc.), documents (corporate policy on overtime, downloads of
employee time records, etc.), and pretrial rulings that could conflict
if the claims were litigated separately.201
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 42 F. Supp. 3d 52, 59 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
Sec’y of Labor v. Labbe, 319 F. App’x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2008)).
200 Driscoll, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 58-59 (denying motion to dismiss that challenged pleading
for lacking allegations of specific hours worked and pay owed: “An allegation of a specific
number of hours adds nothing as far as the plausibility standard is concerned . . . .
Furthermore, requiring Driscoll to allege the number of overtime hours he worked without
compensation could be pointless when that figure may be subject to amendment after
discovery and could also be contested at trial.”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)).
201 See, e.g., In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 545
F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1364-–65 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2008) (“All actions share factual
questions arising out of similar allegations that . . . store managers are entitled to overtime
pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Centralization . . . will eliminate duplicative
discovery; avoid inconsistent pretrial rulings, including those with respect to certification
198
199
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Under this article’s theory that modest commonality is enough
to justify Rule 20 joinder, and thus collective action treatment under
§ 216(b), a mix of similarity and dissimilarity ordinarily will suffice
to make consolidated proceedings proper – but not always. The
federal multi-district litigation panel, which consolidates many
FLSA (and other) cases spanning multiple districts, noted as such in
In re CVS Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Employment Practices
Litigation:202
[T]he Panel has routinely centralized . . . [claims] that the
defendant[s] . . . failed to pay a group of employees . . . .
[D]efendants in these dockets sought the convenience of
defending all . . . in a single venue. The Panel had reason to
believe that the defendants’ relevant corporate employment
policies applied consistently throughout their locations or that
their common practices would outweigh any limited variances at
individual localities . . . . [T]he presence of state law claims or
statewide putative classes, in addition to claims under the
FLSA, has not presented an impediment to centralization, as it
is “within the very nature of coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings . . . to apply the law of more than one state.”. . .
. . . . Nevertheless, . . . in some other FLSA dockets, we have
found the case for centralization to be less convincing,
particularly where (1) the duties of the subject employees
appeared to be subject to significant local variances, (2) the
defendants and/or some of the plaintiffs opposed centralization,
or (3) only a few or procedurally dissimilar cases were
involved.203

In citing numerous cases rejecting consolidation, In re CVS
Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation may
run contrary to this article’s theory that one common issue suffices
of collective actions; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the
judiciary.”) (citations omitted); Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“The parties called 39 witnesses-store managers, district managers, corporate
executives, payroll officials, and expert witnesses . . . [T]he testifying store managers
worked at 50 different Family Dollar stores. The testifying district managers ran . . . 134
different stores. Two testifying Family Dollar executives oversaw 1,400 stores, while a third
testifying executive was in charge of all stores.”).
202 In re CVS Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d
1377 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2010).
203 Id. at 1378-79 (collecting cases).
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for collective treatment – but it may not, for two reasons. First, it
addressed multi-district consolidation, which faces a higher standard
than mere joinder of plaintiffs in a single collective action filed in one
district. Second, it identified considerations that, even in presence of
one common issue, may still militate against consolidated pretrial of
many plaintiffs’ claims:
[1] [D]iscovery in each action is likely to involve individualized,
location-specific examination of things such as a particular
assistant manager’s job duties and the specific tasks assigned to
them in a given store or locality. While some common discovery
will be necessary to determine . . . to what extent the corporate
parent controlled the duties of those employees, such questions
should entail only a limited inquiry. . . .
[2] [The] actions present quite different procedural postures. A
significant amount of discovery has already taken place in the .
. . Henderson action, and a motion for conditional certification is
pending in the . . . Cruz action. By contrast, little, if any, pretrial
activity has occurred in the . . . Ducasse and . . . Belanger actions.
...
[3] A clear majority of plaintiffs, as well as all defendants, oppose
centralization. Although movants are plaintiffs in three of the
seven actions, they are all represented by the same law firm . . .
. [The] motion appears intended to further the interests of
particular counsel . . . .204

Such factors may undercut consolidated pretrial, but even
where consolidated pretrial remains prudent, they more often
undercut consolidated trial. Significant individual issues often will
not sufficiently undercut the efficiency of consolidated pretrial:
common deponents (e.g., regional managers and human resources
officials) can be examined at once; separate deponents (e.g.,
individual store managers) can be examined separately, but that is
no different than in non-consolidated proceedings; and even if
document production is a mix of individual and company-wide, it
may still be most efficiently combined in one production.
Those same significant individual issues, however, may deeply
undercut the efficiency of a consolidated trial, if trial requires
204

Id. at 1379.
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testimony from hundreds of individual managers and separate
verdicts for plaintiffs with different claims. There are ways to
mitigate the extent to which individual issues complicate a
consolidated trial, as detailed in subpart (b) below. Yet such creative
measures will not always suffice to render consolidated trial feasible,
so there remain cases justifying consolidated pretrial, but not
consolidated trial.
Accordingly, this article’s view that one common issue
ordinarily suffices for a collective action is just a view about
consolidated pretrial. Many cases rejecting collective actions for
insufficient commonality would not be contrary to this article if they
found only consolidated trial inappropriate.

4. Mass Evidence: Judicial Discretion to Manage and Set
Limits.
In ordinary litigation, every plaintiff has the right to present his
or her evidence, and every defendant has the right to challenge each
plaintiff’s evidence; the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to
“present [one’s] own arguments and evidence” and “an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses.”205
Class actions substantially lessen the need for every plaintiff to
present evidence and be challenged by the defense, but not entirely:
“A defendant in a class action has a due process right to raise
individual challenges and defenses to claims, and a class action
cannot be certified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks
individual issues.”206 Yet a defendant’s right is not to “individualized
fact-finding or mini-trials” of each class member, because “[t]he
method . . . must be ‘administratively feasible’” – for example, not
taking depositions or trial testimony from all members, but instead
examining documentary evidence as to each plaintiff (e.g., “records
that purport to list” each plaintiff’s transactions), and witnesses with
knowledge spanning many plaintiffs (e.g., “deposing a . . . recordkeeper” who can testify to the documentary evidence as to each

205
206

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
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plaintiff, as well as deposing those co-workers or supervisors who
each worked with a number of class members).207
If, as argued above, § 216(b) collective actions are representative
actions, even if not class actions,208 the nature and definition of a
“representative” action is that named plaintiffs represent others in
the litigation – with whatever support from other witnesses is
necessary to prove that the injuries extended to others, but without
need for every individual to testify personally. Accordingly, in §
216(b) actions as in class actions, to avoid the prospect of dozens,
hundreds, or thousands of plaintiffs all giving essentially similar
testimony, courts can use various strategies to limit the evidence to
be produced by plaintiffs, or challenged by defendants.

a. Representative Discovery: Named Plaintiffs; Sampled OptIns.
Class actions feature testimony and document production by
just a fraction of members, typically named plaintiffs first, then a
modest number of others.209 Early discovery, preceding and focused
on class certification, may be limited to just named plaintiffs and a
few other witnesses.210 Full discovery expands to more class
members, but while Plaintiffs and class counsel may need to produce
information as to many class members, they typically need not
produce individual discovery – depositions, interrogatories, and
individual document production – from each.
Notably, courts have denied plaintiffs’ and defendants’
arguments for broad individualized discovery from class members.
Defendants may seek written interrogatory responses and
depositions from many or all members, but courts typically reject the
“laborious process of answering and/or defending, individual
interrogatories or depositions[, which] would likely be overly
burdensome as well as unnecessarily expensive and timeId. at 307-08.
See supra Part III(A).
209 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(A) (expressly authorizing courts in class actions to
“prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting evidence.”).
210 See, e.g., Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 234 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding no abuse of discretion in, before class certification, “allow[ing] plaintiff’s deposition
and the deposition of experts,” but not other witnesses).
207
208

2019] NO LONGER A SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION?

81

consuming.”211 Plaintiffs may resist disclosing fact summaries from
class members – a common dispute in class actions – by arguing that
defendants can depose members instead, but (at least where such
summaries are unprivileged212) courts sometimes require disclosing
the summaries, rejecting plaintiffs’ alternative of many depositions:
“requir[ing] [defense] counsel to depose each of the 141 individuals .
. . would be unduly burdensome . . . [and] defeat the purpose of
plaintiffs’ class action in the sense that a class action suit allows
discovery to be consolidated through representative plaintiffs.”213
Because Rule 26 allows discovery from any party,214 some
judges who agree that § 216(b) opt-ins are fuller “parties” than Rule
23 class members have ordered full discovery from all opt-ins, even
if there are over a hundred.215 But while the rules presume any party
can face any discovery device, they do not require that every party in
a large multi-party case is. A deposition of one’s opponent, for
example, is ordinarily part of the basic right to press a claim or
defense, and to challenge an opponent’s claim or defense – but it is
not automatic in multi-party cases. The Advisory Committee that
adopted the presumptive limit of ten depositions per side also noted
that “[l]eave to take additional depositions should be granted when
consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2)” providing for
reasonableness and proportionality in the scope and extent of
discovery, which is why many courts are justified in allowing dozens
or more depositions in large class or collective actions.216 Yet that
same Advisory Committee Note expressly stated that a case having

211 Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. 06-1743, 2006 WL 3420591, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22,
2006) (requiring production of “factual information . . . on the completed questionnaires”
class counsel had sent to class members, but not further individual discovery from those
members).
212 See, e.g., Harlow v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 08-2222-KHV-DJW, 2012 WL 646003,
at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2012) (“Because the class members completed and submitted their
online survey responses to Plaintiffs’ counsel after the Court had certified the class, . . .
members are ‘clients’ of Plaintiffs’ counsel and their survey responses communicated to
counsel may therefore be entitled to protection from discovery under the attorney-client
privilege.”).
213 Morisky v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 191 F.R.D. 419, 426 (D.N.J. 2000).
214 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
215 See supra Part II(B)(3)(a).
216 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (1993).
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multiple parties does not automatically enlarge the number of
depositions:
In multi-party cases, the parties on any side are expected to
confer and agree as to which depositions are most needed, given the
presumptive limit on the number of depositions they can take
without leave of court. If these disputes cannot be amicably resolved,
the court can be requested to resolve the dispute or permit additional
depositions.217
For interrogatories, Rule 33 too states a limit, though in
different terms: a limit of 25 interrogatories, unless otherwise
stipulated or ordered in a manner consistent with the basic Rule
26(b)(1)-(2) scope of discovery.218 Neither Rule 33 itself nor its
Advisory Committee Notes clarify whether a party can serve 25
interrogatories multiplied by the number of opposing parties – as a
leading treatise notes, in concluding that, as with depositions, in
multi-party cases, the parties should work out, or otherwise courts
should order, a reasonable number of interrogatories:
[One] possible area of disagreement is counting parties. . . .
Consider, for example, a situation in which ten people injured in
a bus crash sue the bus company in a single suit represented by
the same lawyer. Should they be considered one party or ten for
purposes of the interrogatory limitation? The best result would
seem to be to recognize that in some instances nominally
separate parties should be considered one party for purposes of
the 25-interrogatory limitation . . . .
In the absence of a stipulation, a party wishing to propound
more than 25 interrogatories should seek leave of court. . . . [T]he
court is to be guided by [Rule 26] proportionality considerations
. . . [and] probably approach the matter initially in terms of
whether there is some articulable reason for the need to send
more interrogatories. . . . [I]n many instances the nature of the
case may demonstrate that substantially more interrogatory
discovery will be needed. As the Advisory Committee put it,
“[t]he aim is not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide some

217
218

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1).
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judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use of
this discovery device.”219

In conformity with the simultaneous presumptions of both the
right to depose opponents and the limited number of depositions even
in multi-party cases: even before the recent controversy our prior
article detailed (and worsened) over the class-versus-party status of
§ 216 collective actions, some courts limited collective action
discovery to a modest sample of plaintiffs, despite acknowledging
how opt-ins are fuller “parties” than Rule 23 class members. “[M]any
jurisdictions . . . order[] limited, representative discovery of the
named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs in FLSA actions,” one typical
district court decision summarized after surveying the caselaw.220
That case, Nelson v. American Standard, Inc., acknowledged “that
under . . . § 216(b), filing a consent to join a collective action means
the ‘employee shall be a party plaintiff,’” thereby letting defendants
seek discovery from all, because “unlike [in] Rule 23 cases, there are
no ‘absent parties’” and the Federal Rules “allow parties to serve
interrogatories, admissions, and requests for production of
documents ‘on any other party.’”221 Despite opt-in plaintiffs’ “party”
status, discovery from a mere sample remains proper, Nelson
explained with more detail than in most, typically short, discovery
decisions:
[L]imiting discovery in a FLSA action to a relevant sample
minimizes the burden . . . on the plaintiffs “while affording the
defendant a reasonable opportunity to explore, discover and
establish an evidentiary basis for its defenses.”. . . The
fundamental precept of statistics and sampling is that
meaningful differences among class members can be determined
from a sampl[e] . . . [if the] group of “Discovery Plaintiffs” is a

219 WRIGHT ET AL., 8B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2168.1 (3d ed.) (emphasis added)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1) advisory committee’s note, 146 F.R.D. 401, 675-76 (1993)).
220 Nelson v. Am. Standard, Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-10-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-390-TJW-CE,
2009 WL 4730166, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2009); see also, e.g., Scott v. Chipotle Mexican
Grill, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“‘[I]t is well-established that the [plaintiff]
may present the testimony of a representative sample of employees as part of his proof of
the prima facie case under the FLSA.’”) (quoting Reich v. S. New England Tel. Corp., 121
F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1997).
221 Nelson, 2009 WL 4730166, at *2.
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statistically acceptable representative sample of the entire
group of opt-in Plaintiffs.222

While the propriety of sampled discovery in § 216(b) collective
actions is “well-established,” there is “no ‘bright line formulation’ or
‘percentage threshold’ for . . . the adequacy of representational
evidence.”223 Yet the caselaw shows two patterns: (a) a tradeoff
between the depth of discovery (i.e., depositions or just documents,
and how detailed questions are) and the breadth of the sample (i.e.,
the number facing discovery); and (b) the larger the size of the
collective, the smaller the percentage sample courts deem necessary.
For example, courts have allowed:
• depositions of only 33 of 162 opt-ins (20.3%), but
interrogatories to all 162, limited to damages only – because this
modest-sized collective action was not bifurcated into a liability
phase and a later damages phase, so each opt-in would have to
prove damages at trial anyway;224
• in a class litigated under Rule 23, yet illustrating the
tradeoff between depth of discovery and breadth of sample, the
court ordered a sample of 75 of 400 class members (18.8%),
which was broader than plaintiffs wanted, but without the depth
defendants sought – only interrogatories and documents, not
depositions, and only on three specified topics;225
• for a large opt-in population, a far smaller percentage
sample – 91 of 1,328 (6.9%) in one case,226 58 of 582 opt-ins plus
the few named plaintiffs in another (roughly 10%),227 and 90 of

Id. at *3.
Scott, 300 F.R.D. at 192 (quoting Reich, 121 F.3d at 67).
224 Krueger v. New York Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
225 Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (allowing
discovery from a “sample of not more than twenty-five” of the 350 class members who were
simply typical employees (7.1%), but also from another 50 who faced discovery because
their specific jobs made them fact witnesses beyond just their class membership, for a total
of 75 of 400 class members (18.8%) facing individualized discovery).
226 Nelson v. Am. Std. Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-10-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-390-TJW-CE, 2009 WL
4730166, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2009).
227 Scott, 300 F.R.D. at 192.
222
223
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“over 1,500” (5.7-5.9%, depending on how “over 1,500” the total
was) in another;228 and
• deposition and written discovery from all where the
population was especially small – 36 in one case,229 49 in
another.230

In sum, the § 216(b) grant of party status to opt-ins does not
require full discovery from all, because that same statutory
provision’s core purpose was to streamline litigation of similar wage
claims:
The FLSA envisions a collective action . . . in which claims of
similarly situated workers are adjudicated collectively rather
than individually. . . . [T]he purpose of the collective action [is] .
. . “efficient adjudication of similar claims, [for] ‘similarly
situated’ employees, whose claims are often small and not likely
to be brought on an individual basis.”231

Thus, § 216(b) simultaneously grants party status to all opt-ins
while streamlining the collective discovery and trial, leaving judges
the discretion to limit discovery and trial testimony, as long as (a)
the case is large enough to make discovery of all infeasible and (b)
the sample chosen is sufficiently representative to allow the defense
a fair opportunity to challenge the claims.

b. Bellwether Trials: Trials of Small Number of Plaintiffs’
Claims First, in Hopes of Avoiding Mass Trials or Mass
Discovery.
How to conduct a trial of hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs’
claims is a question arising regularly in class actions,232 but can be
Smith v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 354, 356 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
Ingersoll v. Royal & Sunalliance, Inc., No. C05-1774-MAT, 2006 WL 2091097, at *3
(W.D. Wash. July 25, 2006).
230 See Rosen v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 1675 (LMM), 1994 WL 652534, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994).
231 Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing
Lynch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 491 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y.2007)).
232 Few class actions actually reach trial, because most settle or are dismissed, but “the
need for a trial plan often comes up in the context of class certification. Perhaps it is for
this reason that the majority of the cases . . . the Court has identified that make reference
228
229
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more complex when, as in § 216(b) collective actions, plaintiffs are
numerous, yet to an extent are individual parties. But in many cases
that are neither class nor collective actions, hundreds of individual
plaintiffs (or more) have their claims consolidated, most commonly
mass tort cases in which individual plaintiffs each allege significant,
yet often quite varied, physical injuries.233 In the federal statute on
when non-class actions with many plaintiffs are enough like class
actions to justify removal from state court on the same terms as class
actions, “the term ‘mass action’ means any civil action . . . in which
monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common
questions of law or fact.”234 Mass actions sharing issues of core
importance (often the same tortious act, event, or product) are often
consolidated for pretrial – or, conversely, inefficient and illogical to
relegate to separate pretrial proceedings that would feature many of
the same motions, depositions, and document productions. Dunson
v. Cordis Corp.235 explained why, in agreeing with the parties that
consolidation of the actions “for purposes of pretrial discovery and
proceedings, along with the formation of a bellwether-trial process,
will avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures in all
of the actions, avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications, and avoid
many of the same witnesses testifying on common issues in all
actions, as well as promote judicial economy and convenience.”236
Yet unlike class or collective actions, mass actions clearly
require trials for all individual plaintiffs, not a representative trial
for only a subset, because such cases lack any authorization for a
to trial plans do so when a court is faced with a motion for class certification.” Willcox v.
Lloyds TSB Bank, No. 13-00508 ACK-RLP, 2016 WL 4374943, at *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 15,
2016).
233 See, e.g., In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 302
(3d Cir. 2017) (noting, in tort claims against drug manufacturer for failure to warn that
osteoporosis drug could cause atypical bone fractures: “A mass tort MDL is not a class
action. It is a collection of separate lawsuits that are coordinated for pretrial proceedings.”);
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002) (mass individual claims under
Alien Tort Claims Act “that the Defendants directly or indirectly subjected the villagers to
forced labor, murder, rape, and torture when the Defendants constructed a gas pipeline” in
Myanmar).
234 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
235 See generally Dunson v. Cordis Corp., 854 F.3d 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
471 (2017).
236 Id. at 554.
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small number of plaintiffs to litigate “as representative parties on
behalf of all members” (under Rule 23)237 or “for and in behalf of . . .
other employees” (under § 216(b)).238 Yet mass actions, despite the
individualized nature of their claims, often streamline the process of
resolving hundreds or thousands of claims, Dunson noted, with “a
bellwether-trial process” – in which “the claims of a representative
plaintiff (or small group of plaintiffs) are tried” before all others.
Bellwether trials can significantly reduce the time, cost, and burden
of resolving hundreds or thousands of claims simultaneously in three
ways.
(1) Agreement for bellwether verdicts to resolve all claims. All
parties may, before the bellwether trials occur, “agree that they
will be bound by the outcome of that trial, at least as to common
issues.”239
(2) Using bellwether verdicts as a settlement aid. The “far more
common” bellwether process features no agreement to be bound:
“results of the trial are used in the other cases purely for
informational purposes as an aid to settlement”240 – and can be
powerful, although nonbinding, because cases typically settle
when uncertainty decreases.241
(3) Binding determinations only on specific issues. Even with no
agreement to be bound, “a verdict favorable to the plaintiff in the
bellwether trial might be binding on the defendant under
ordinary principles of issue preclusion” – such as a
determination that due care was not exercised, or that a product
was defective.242

Any of the above three scenarios can save the significant time
and cost of not only trials, but possibly also discovery, of hundreds or
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
239 Dunson, 854 F.3d at 555 (citing ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 2.02, cmt. b, p. 87 (2010), and RESTATEMENT (2D) OF JUDGMENTS § 40, cmt. a,
p. 390 (1980)).
240 Dunson, 854 F.3d at 555.
241 See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of
Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 873-74 (2007) (discussing settlement
inventives and uncertainty).
242 Dunson, 854 F.3d at 555.
237
238
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thousands of claims – depending on their timing. The simplest way
to time bellwether trials is to conduct them after all claims complete
discovery – but if discovery is especially expensive and claims are
especially similar, a small number of claims could proceed through
both discovery and trial before full discovery for all others. In one
case, for example, the parties exchanged basic class-wide discovery,
then engaged in deep individual discovery, and planned trials, for
just a few bellwether plaintiffs; “given the importance of these
bellwether trials,” the court ordered disclosure of individual earnings
and tax records from only each bellwether plaintiff.243
Most bellwether trial plans are agreed upon by the parties, as
Dunson noted – but a judge can order them without parties’
agreement. In one case, a district court denied a class certification
motion as premature, “finding that bellwether trials were needed to
assess the propriety of certifying such a class” – after which “several
Plaintiffs were selected for the first of three bellwether trials,” and
the parties “completed discovery” for those plaintiffs first, in
anticipation of bellwether trials that would help the court clarify the
fate of the rest of the class.244 Rather than leave key matters such as
bellwether plaintiff selection and trial planning to the parties, the
court issued an order detailing the following:
(a) the pool of plaintiffs (those residing in certain counties and
are represented by one of three plaintiffs’ counsel);
(b) the number of random selections (25);
(c) the limited extent to which the parties could narrow the
randomly chosen group (to 15);
(d) the exact extent to which bellwether plaintiffs would have
their cases tried together (three trials of five plaintiffs each), and
(e) a quick schedule for those trials to commence (barely six
months from the date of the order).245

243

1996).

In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 153, 153-54 (E.D. Tex.

244 In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800-01 (E.D.
Tex. 2002).
245 In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1038, 1996 WL 571535, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 1996).
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Bellwether trials do not make sense for all collective actions. In
cases with just a few dozen plaintiffs, trying the claims of 15 first (as
in the above plan) hardly saves much time, and could just prolong
the litigation. In cases with just barely enough common issues for
collective treatment, a small number of claims is unlikely to be
similar enough to the rest for a few bellwether trials to resolve much.
But many collective actions are perfect for bellwether trials –
especially those with (a) enough plaintiffs that taking a small
number of bellwether claims through all pretrial stages and trial
would be far cheaper and quicker than trying to resolve several
hundred or thousands of claims at once, and (b) enough common
issues that the results of just several trials are likely to show the fate
of the entire population, or at least to yield issue preclusion that
could streamline the remaining claims.
Just as judges use their pretrial management powers to
encourage parties to consider settling, they could use those powers to
encourage bellwether trials – or even order them, despite a lack of
agreement from the parties, if the court believes they could be
fruitful. Ordering specific processes for bellwether trials, such as the
one detailed above, is within judges’ Rule 16 pretrial and trial
management powers.
Firstly, a core Rule 16 power is to “set dates for pretrial
conferences and for trial”246 and schedule pretrial through
discovery247 and summary judgment.248 Those powers alone could
justify bellwether trials, simply with an order setting one date to
complete pretrial and hold trials for most claims, but with much
earlier dates for a small number, which would make them the
“bellwether” claims.
Secondly, Rule 16 authorizes judges to “adopt[]special
procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions
that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal
questions, or unusual proof problems,”249 and more specifically to
“order[] a separate trial under Rule 42(b) of a claim . . . or particular
issue”250 – which, even if bellwether trials were not what the drafters
246
247
248
249
250

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2)(B)(iv).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(E).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(M).
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of Rule 16 had in mind, arguably fully authorizes an order of
bellwether trials.

c. Trial Bifurcation of Liability and Damages – To Separate,
and Possibly Obviate Need for, Individualized Damages
Proceedings.
Even in class actions with highly common claims, damages for
each individual, or defenses particular to certain individuals, can be
too individualized for a wholly common trial. Courts therefore often
bifurcate class action trials: most commonly, a class trial on liability
is the first phase of trial, followed by a damages trial examining
evidence of each plaintiff’s damages that constitutes the second
phase of trial.251 Alternatively, if damages are formulaic enough to
be capable of classwide proof by common evidence, then the firstphase trial can cover liability and damages, with a second-phase trial
limited to narrow individualized issues such as defenses that apply
only to certain individuals or subsets of the class.252
Bifurcation can save trial time and cost in two ways. First, if the
first-phase liability trial yields a defense verdict, then no secondphase proceedings on damages or individualized evidence are
necessary at all. Accordingly, if a bifurcated trial yields a defense
verdict, then it likely saved significant time compared to a nonbifurcated trial, in which reaching a defense verdict would have
required a full trial that included individualized damages and
defense evidence.
Second, and most relevant here, limiting the first-phase trial to
the more common liability issues, rather than the more
individualized damages or defenses, lets the first-phase trial proceed
without full testimony from all or even most plaintiffs. The court
251 See, e.g., Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The trial
of class actions is usually bifurcated into a liability phase and a remedial phase. First, in
the liability phase . . . , the plaintiff must prove . . . the plaintiff class’s eligibility for
appropriate . . . . relief. . . [Second,] with regard to the remedial phase of the suit, . . . relief
for individuals is considered.”).
252 See, e.g., Willcox v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, No. 13-00508 ACK-RLP, 2016 WL
4374943, at *4 (D. Haw. Aug. 15, 2016) (entering order “bifurcating (1) all issues and
defenses common to all class members, and (2) any claims or defenses involving individual
class members that are not common to the class, including the ‘unique defenses’ [defendant]
intends to raise” against only certain plaintiffs).
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noted as such in Willcox v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC,253 a class action
featuring two different contract claims against loans taken by all
class members: not only liability, but the formulaic damages
plaintiffs claimed, were capable of common proof in a first-phase
trial, which would be followed by a second-phase trial limited to “any
claims or defenses involving individual class members that are not
common to the class, including the ‘unique defenses’ [defendant]
intends to raise” against only certain plaintiffs.254
The Willcox logic about how common the liability issue was, and
how formulaic damages were, applies well to those FLSA collective
actions with essentially identical wage claims, such as that nobody
received overtime for hours past 40 in a week, or that all workers in
a certain job were misclassified as exempt:
[T]his case involves only two claims and no subclasses, and proof
of liability and damages is straightforward and achievable
through common evidence. . . . [T]he “key legal issue” – whether
[Defendant] permissibly passed on [a] . . . charge to borrowers .
. . is common to all. . . .
Plaintiffs . . . will use the same methodology to calculate
damages for each . . . class [member]. . . . [A]n Excel spreadsheet
that uses information obtained about the Wilcox . . . [is] how Mr.
Petley intends to calculate damages for each of the loans in the
class.255

d. Trials Without Need For All Plaintiffs To Testify.
Even in non-representative aggregate litigation – such as the
“mass actions” detailed above – courts may deploy some of these
strategies and are encouraged to do so by leading commentary. First,
as detailed above, bellwethers trials can sometimes avoid the need
for all plaintiffs to testify at trial, or even at depositions, if either (a)
the parties agree that the bellwether trials will bind as to all claims,
(b) the bellwether results provide useful enough information to spur
settlement, or (c) the bellwether results yield the sort of plaintiff’s
verdict that streamlines trial of the remaining claims by issue-

253
254
255

See id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3-4.
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precluding the defense from denying key issues, such as whether
employees in a certain job title were overtime-exempt.
Second, there is no requirement that plaintiffs themselves
testify to prove their claims, and at least on claims of relatively
simpler wage violations, documents showing each plaintiff’s hours
worked and pay received may suffice as proof of wage violations. One
or two witnesses can attest to the documents (such as a document
custodian at the employer) and explain or summarize what the data
shows (such as an expert witness analyzing the data, or even a lay
plaintiff or other witness who can competently attest to having
performed the sometimes simple FLSA math on hours and pay data).
Even if few witnesses’ testimony and documents can meet plaintiffs’
burdens of proof, Defendants can, of course, challenge that proof by
calling witnesses, including calling any plaintiffs as adverse
witnesses. But at least in a large collective action, after Defendants
call dozens of witnesses, a judge’s discretionary powers over trial
evidence include “exclud[ing] relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”256 That authority authorizes exclusion of otherwise
relevant witnesses whose testimony would be repetitive.257
Third, even if testimony from all plaintiffs is unavoidable, it
need not take the form of live testimony. Rule 32 allows deposition
testimony to be submitted into evidence under various
circumstances. The most easily satisfied circumstance is “that the
witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial”258
— which would be the situation for most plaintiffs in many
nationwide or large statewide collective actions. Even as to plaintiffs
within 100 miles, deposition testimony can substitute for live
FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Bowman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
Rule 403 exclusion of witness with relevant testimony because another witness covered the
same issues); Rountree v. Johanns, 382 F. Supp. 2d 19, 34 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding exclusion
of witnesses proper under Rule 403: “Plaintiff cites cases for the proposition that a witness
who offers testimony ‘material to the crucial issue of intent’ must be admitted . . . . However,
these cases are fact specific; they certainly do not stand for the proposition that all
witnesses who may add some additional detail need be allowed to testify.”).
258 FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B).
256
257
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testimony “on motion and notice, [if] exceptional circumstances make
it desirable—in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of live testimony in open court—to permit the deposition
to be used”259 – and at least in especially large collective actions, a
judge’s discretion would seem to include finding the need to avoid
several hundred or thousand live witnesses an “exceptional
circumstance.” Using depositions requires that all such plaintiffs
have been deposed, of course, but plaintiff’s counsel who wishes to
avoid live trial testimony by using depositions can substantially save
the time and cost of depositions by noticing Rule 31 “Depositions by
Written Questions,” in which both sides submit written questions in
advance, and the witness testifies to the answers with a court
reporter present, but neither counsel present.260 In a wage collective
action, both sides’ counsel often could write one set of questions for
all plaintiffs (or one set of questions for each of several categories of
plaintiffs), which would take far less time than attending hundreds
of depositions.

5. Settlement.
a. Scope of Court Authority: Less Than Rule 23; But More Than
Individual Cases If Too Many Plaintiffs for Individual Consent.
As noted previously, courts in § 216(b) collective actions are not
governed by Rule 23 class action provisions, so they lack Rule 23(f)
judicial power to decide the substantive “fairness” of a settlement.
Yet at least in § 216(b) collective actions with too many plaintiffs for
individual settlement approval to be feasible, they can and should
still scrutinize settlements for procedural and ethics rules
compliance.
Except in Rule 23 class actions, when parties file a Rule 41(a)
dismissal stipulation, “the district court may not attach any
conditions to the dismissal. After the notice of voluntary dismissal is
filed, the district court loses jurisdiction over the case.”261 With the

259
260
261

FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(E).
FED. R. CIV. P. 31(b).
In re Amerijet Int’l, 785 F.3d 967, 973 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
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court’s losing jurisdiction as soon as a dismissal stipulation is filed,
courts cannot even require parties to disclose settlement terms.262
However, citing two 1940s Supreme Court decisions, some
courts hold that FLSA settlements, even in individual (noncollective) actions, “require the approval of the district court” or the
Department of Labor.263 Yet those two cases, Brooklyn Savings Bank
v. O’Neil264 and D.A. Schulte, Inc. Gangi,265 were narrower than a
requirement that courts approve all FLSA settlements.
“The issue presented . . . is whether in the absence of a bona fide
dispute between the parties as to liability,” Brooklyn Savings Bank
held, a settlement “bars a subsequent action to recover liquidated
damages. We are of the opinion that it does not bar such claim”; the
Court elaborated that “the record in this case shows that the release
was not given in settlement of a bona fide dispute … with respect to
coverage or amount.”266 D.A. Schulte went further – “liquidated
damages cannot be bargained away by bona fide settlements of
disputes over [statutory] coverage” – but key to that holding was that
“the employees receive[d] the overtime compensation in full,” an
employer concession of liability.267 “Under threat of suit, petitioner
paid the overtime,” D.A. Schulte noted, with the amount undisputed:
the parties “computed the amount [and] . . . raise[d] no question as
to its accuracy.”268 D.A. Schulte expressly said its holding against
compromise settlements did not extend to cases with dispute as to
the fact or amount of liability: “Nor do we need to consider here . . .
compromises in other situations . . . , such as a dispute over the
number of hours worked or the regular [pay] rate.”269
With both 1940s cases imposing judicial scrutiny only to
waivers of liquidated damages where there was no dispute on the
262 Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t was a serious
abuse of discretion for the district court to refer to the magnitude of the settlement
amount—theretofore confidential.”); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 904, 904 (10th Cir. 1989)
(“[U]nder [Rule 41] the stipulation of dismissal divested the district court of any jurisdiction
it might have had to order the settlement agreement made public.”).
263 Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015).
264 See generally Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
265 See generally D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
266 Brooklyn Sav. Bank’, 324 U.S. at 703-04.
267 D.A. Schulte, 328 U.S. at 114.
268 Id. at 111–12.
269 Id. at 114–15.
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fact or amount of liability, they likely should not apply to a typical
settlement, which “is an enforceable resolution of those FLSA claims
predicated on a bona fide dispute about time worked and not as a
compromise of guaranteed FLSA substantive rights themselves,” as
the Fifth Circuit has held.270 Some courts instead have required
approval for any “stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims,” as the
Second Circuit held in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc.,271
citing both 1940s cases and Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. Department of
Labor, a similar Eleventh Circuit holding.272 Yet there may be little
real disagreement among these cases. Lynn’s Food Stores required
court scrutiny where, as in both 1940s cases, liability was not in
genuine dispute by the time of the settlement, which came only after
the Labor Department found the employer “liable . . . for back wages
and liquidated damages.”273 Cheeks detailed a limited rationale and
scope of settlement scrutiny: “[e]xamining the basis on which district
courts recently rejected several proposed FLSA settlements
highlights the potential for abuse.”274 In each example Cheeks gave,
a court rejected a settlement for abusive pressure or conflicts of
interest – that is, for impropriety, not just too low an amount:
• one settlement not only subjected employees to draconian
restrictions and broad waivers, but included attorney fees of “40
and 43.6 percent of the total settlement payment without
adequate documentation”;
• another required “plaintiff’s attorney not to represent any
person bringing similar claims,” which (among other problems)
violates the express prohibition on any settlement “in which a
restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the
settlement”;275 and
• in two others, workers were pressured by vulnerable
circumstances that the courts feared the settlements may have
exploited.276

270
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Martin v. Spring Break ‘83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012).
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015).
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc., v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir.1982).
Id. at 1352.
Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206 (emphasis added).
ABA MODEL R. PROF. COND. 5.6(b).
Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206 (collecting cases; citations omitted).
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Thus, judicial rejection of FLSA settlements appears to require
not just substantive insufficiency of the settlement, but some basis
for fearing procedural impropriety, such as undue pressure or an
attorney conflict of interest.
With the argument for judicial scrutiny of FLSA settlements a
debatable and exceptional departure from the rule allowing parties
to settle at will, many courts reject judicial settlement scrutiny, as in
the following analysis by one court:
[T]he plain language of the FLSA does not require judicial
approval. . . . While there may be risks that low wage employees
will be coerced into settlement, . . . the same risks are present in
other areas of the law for which court approval is not required (.
. . . “Thus, the issue . . . is broader than the FLSA, and if it is . .
. a problem, it is one for Congress to address.”) Holding otherwise
would waste valuable resources by requiring the Court to . . .
“examine the bona fides of the dispute,” hold a fairness hearing,
and write . . . [an] order assessing the merits of the settlement. .
. . It is understandable . . . in the Rule 23 class action context,
where a settlement agreement binds absent class members. . . .
[However], great numbers of civil cases of all categories are
settled and closed without court supervision. . . . The Court sees
no reason . . . [to] depart from that practice with respect to FLSA
settlements without express statutory language requiring it. . .
.277

Yet the no-judicial-scrutiny cases still allow some judicial
scrutiny for pressure-and-ethics improprieties. Firstly, by applying
the rule that permits true compromise of disputed FLSA claims, yet
disallows mere waiver of FLSA rights, courts can scrutinize whether,
“under these facts[,] . . . the release resulted from a bona fide [wage]
dispute.”278 The Fifth Circuit so held Bodle v. TXL Mortgage Corp,
finding FLSA claims were not settled in a bona fide dispute but were
waived in unrelated state court litigation, with no assurance they
277 Marrano v. Oyster Bay Animal Hosp., P.C., No. 14-CV-2751 (ADS)(SIL), 2015 WL
4715207, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2015) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Oldershaw v.
DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1116 (D. Colo. 2017) (“[J]udicial
approval of a settlement agreement is not required except when stated by statute, and
there is no express requirement in 29 U.S.C. § 216 that a court approve an FLSA
settlement.”).
278 Bodle v. TXL Mortg. Corp., 788 F.3d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 2015).
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were “bargained away” instead of waived – because in the state case,
“overtime pay was never specifically negotiated[ and] there is no
guarantee . . . plaintiffs will be compensated for the overtime.”279
Even outside the FLSA, courts may scrutinize whether a voluntary
dismissal based on whether a settlement arose from undue pressure
or other impropriety:
While . . . stipulated dismissal under Rule 41 . . . is self-executing
and does not require judicial approval, a court may decline to
permit a voluntary dismissal . . . to avoid short-circuiting the
judicial process, or . . . safeguard . . . persons entitled to …
protection. . . .[A] “court, exercising its inherent powers, may
look behind [settlements] to determine whether there is
collusion or other improper conduct giving rise to the
dismissal.”280

Thus, courts have similar, but broader, power to scrutinize
procedural and substantive unreasonableness than under
unconscionability contract law.281
But compared to single- or few-plaintiff cases, or to basic
contracts, § 216(b) collective actions with large numbers of plaintiffs
present more concern that opt-in plaintiffs may not actually enjoy
autonomous decision-making, absent procedures to protected their
rights to participate and make their own decisions. Accordingly, in
par (b) below, we suggest a set of measures that strike a balance
between preserving the representative nature of a collective action
and protecting the rights of a large group of plaintiffs who cannot
easily all be personal participants in major decisions such as
settlement.

Id. at 165.
Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1301 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting court power to
scrutinize a settlement a lawyer executes for a client who is “legally incompetent” or “under
a disability” relevant to the ability to settle a case) (quoting United States v. MercedesBenz of N. Am., 547 F.Supp. 399, 400 (N.D. Cal. 1982))
281 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
unconscionability doctrine has two components: (1) substantive unconscionability, i.e.,
unfair and unreasonable contract terms, and (2) procedural unconscionability, i.e.,
individualized circumstances surrounding each of the parties to a contract such that no
voluntary meeting of the minds was possible.”) (applying Ohio law; also citing Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (establishing
unconscionability doctrine)).
279
280
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b. The Specific Protections Appropriate for Large Collective
Actions: Consent, Authority, And Rights Provisions (“CARP”).
Even if the above suggestions could help collective actions
proceed efficiently and with parties’ rights protected, judges and
parties may still have concerns about attorney-client relationship
ambiguities in no-certification collective actions. While collective
actions are representative actions, a § 216(b) opt-in form does not
necessarily include any details about the attorney-client
relationship. Even properly executed opt-ins thus leave ambiguities
about the authority of named plaintiffs and counsel to settle, opt-ins’
decision-making and notice rights, and other key matters.
Good practices by counsel and by judges alike can clarify these
ambiguities and redress these concerns, however. Most simply,
plaintiffs’ counsel can have all opt-in plaintiffs execute a retainer
agreement. That might seem burdensome, but plaintiffs’ counsel
already must provide potential opt-in plaintiffs with paperwork they
must sign – the opt-in form that must be filed for any plaintiff to join
– that typically is accompanied by information on the case, whether
court-ordered notice or just information from counsel or from the
named plaintiffs on what the case is. Accordingly, the opt-in notice
can be accompanied by, or even could contain, a retainer agreement
specifying the nature of the attorney-client relationship.
Whether in a retainer or in a notice, however, the exact set of
rights and responsibilities for the attorney-client relationship
between plaintiffs’ counsel and opt-ins remains a difficult question.
One of the trickiest specific issues is settlement. In a large collective
action, procuring agreement on settlement terms from potentially
thousands of plaintiffs can be daunting or infeasible – but counsel’s
mere retention is not enough to empower him or her to make the
settlement decision for all opt-in plaintiffs. The relevant ethics rule
is that “a lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation,” but under the
same rule, the “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to
settle a matter.”282 Thus, “a client’s retention of an attorney does not
in itself confer implied or apparent authority on that attorney to

282

ABA MODEL R. PROF. COND. 1.2(a).
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settle or compromise the client’s claim,283 and it is professional
misconduct for attorneys to settle without client consent,284 or even
to execute attorney-client agreements delegating full settlement
authority to the attorney.285 Courts similarly reject agreements in
which multiple plaintiffs delegate settlement authority to a smaller
number of plaintiffs in the same case, finding them violations of the
Rule 1.8(6) ban on an “aggregate settlement” covering multiple
plaintiffs without “informed consent,” because settlement consent
cannot be “informed” if it is granted in advance of knowing the actual
terms.286
We propose that opt-in plaintiffs be provided, by plaintiffs’
counsel, a written set of disclosures and terms that we call consent,
authority, and rights provisions – “CARP” – before they opt in, or
promptly after they opt in if they obtained and submitted an opt-in
form other than directly from plaintiffs’ counsel. Following are the
recommended CARP provisions:

Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1300-01 (Ind. 1998).
See, e.g., In re O’Meara’s Case, 54 A.3d 762, 767 (N.H. 2012) (“O’Meara violated Rule
1.2(a) because . . . he communicated a demand to settle the personal injury case for $11
million even though the Conants had not authorized him to settle for this amount.”); In re
White, 663 S.E.2d 21, 22 (S.C. 2008) (upholding lawyer’s suspension for accepting insurer’s
settlement offer without client’s authorization).
285 See, e.g., In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81, 81 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding
that fee agreement delegating all settlement authority to lawyer violated Rule 1.2(a)); In
re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 1997) (holding that fee agreement in which client
gave up right to determine whether to accept settlement offer violated Rule 1.2(a)); In re
Coleman, 295 S.W. 3d 857, 860, 863 (Mo. 2009) (holding that agreement stating the lawyer
“shall have the exclusive right to determine when and for how much to settle this case”
violated Rule 1.2(a)); In re Bilderback, 971 P.2d 1061, 1061 (Colo. 1999) (disbarring
attorney who, among other violations, settled injury case without client authorization).
286 See generally Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048, 1051 (D.
Colo. 1999) (finding Rule 1.7 barred group engagement agreement permitting “steering
committee” of plaintiffs to control settlement, and barring individual settlements by
providing that no plaintiff could execute an individual agreement to receive any settlement
proceeds until all plaintiffs had settled; holding that “any provision of an attorney-client
agreement which deprives a client of the right to control their case is void as against public
policy”); Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 513 (N.J. 2006) (holding
attorney may not obtain clients’ advance consent to abide by majority vote of clients on
settlement); Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 894–95 (10th Cir. 1975)
(“[A]llowing the majority to govern the rights of the minority is violative of the basic tenets
of the attorney-client relationship . . . . [I]t is essential that the final settlement be subject
to the client’s ratification particularly in a non-class action case.”).
283
284
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(a) right to sue individually instead – if they prefer the greater
control of individual litigation over the clout and efficiency of
collective litigation;
(b) communication rights and duties – counsel must
communicate major case events (e.g., settlement), and plaintiffs
must keep counsel updated; and
(c) settlement consent and rights – named plaintiffs and counsel
are authorized to negotiate settlements binding everyone not
opting out after notice of the settlement terms.

These provisions would allow a settlement process that in which
the named plaintiffs and counsel carry the laboring oar, but in which
all opt-ins’ rights are protected. Even if plaintiffs cannot delegate full
authority to settle their claims, they certainly can delegate authority
to negotiate a settlement proposal – as in any case in which opposing
lawyers negotiate, then report back to their clients with any
proposals from the other side. Thus, opt-in plaintiffs can authorize
named plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel to negotiate settlement and
obtain settlement proposals – which opt-in plaintiffs then would be
free to consent to or reject.
Critically, reject/consent decisions by opt-in plaintiffs need not
be express statements of consent that all of hundreds or thousands
of them must personally sign. Settlements are governed by basic
contract law principles,287 and “an offer may be accepted by conduct
or acquiescence” if the parties so agree, ex ante:
while mere silence . . . cannot be construed as acceptance . . . , a
party’s silence will be deemed as acquiescence where he or she
is under such a duty to speak . . . . Such a duty may be created
by a course of conduct or by an explicit statement by the offeree
which gives the offeror reason to understand that silence will
constitute acceptance.288

Thus, contracting parties – including plaintiffs and their
counsel – can agree in advance to the following: that party A can
submit a proposal to party B, which party B may reject, but which
287 See Moss, Illuminating Secrecy, supra note 247, at 883 (noting that a “settlement is
just a contractual agreement by two parties”).
288 Joy T. Carmichael et al., Manner of acceptance of offer to contract; sufficiency—By
silence or inaction, 22 N.Y. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 47 (2d ed. & 2018 update).
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will be deemed consented to if party B declines to object. For consentby-acquiescence to work, however, (a) counsel must commit to
promptly sending any proposed settlement to all plaintiffs, (b)
plaintiffs must commit to keeping counsel updated as to their contact
information, and (c) any proposed settlement must provide a
reasonable period for notice and opt-out.
While CARP is not in any statute or rule, courts do have
authority to implement CARP as collective action requirements. Rule
16 authorizes the typically uncontroversial initial scheduling order
that courts issue – but that order can extend beyond the usual
(deadlines for amendments, motions, etc.) to cover all “appropriate
matters.”289 It provides that after “any conference under this rule,
the court should issue an order reciting the action taken”290 – and
covered matters can include “settling the case and using special
procedures to assist in resolving the dispute.”291
The Advisory Committee Notes confirm that the references to
settlement matters were meaningful additions to Rule 16, even if
applicable to only a modest subset of cases. The introduction to the
1983 Note stressed that “pretrial conferences may improve the
quality of justice rendered in the federal courts by . . . improving, as
well as facilitating, the settlement process.”292 The 1993 Note further
stressed the value of creativity in facilitating settlement,
encouraging “various procedures that, in addition to traditional
settlement conferences, may be helpful in settling. . . . [J]udge[s] and
attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as
mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and
nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual resolution of the
dispute without a full trial.”293
Yet beyond Rule 16, courts have inherent power to assure
ethical and procedural propriety of any litigation conduct, powers
that courts already have exercised in large and complex non-class
cases. A notable example is New Mexico v. Aamodt,294 a decadesspanning water dispute that was not a class action but, like a large
289
290
291
292
293
294

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(vii).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1983).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1993).
537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976).
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FLSA collective action, was a large, complex case with “about 1,000 .
. . named” parties.295 Objectors to a settlement cited Rule 23
precedent to argue that settlement proponents bore the burden to
prove the settlement “fair, reasonable and adequate,”296 but the
Court took a middle-ground view of its settlement authority.
On the one hand, the Court rejected the argument for “placing
the burden of proof on [settlement] proponents” in a non-class action,
even a large, complex one: “Class action suits have the ability to bind
people who are not individual litigants and thus create potential
risks of prejudice and unfairness for absent class members,” the
Court noted, which “imposes unique responsibilities on the court and
counsel” that are absent in even large non-class cases.297 On the
other hand, the Court exercised the power to decide whether
objectors can meet a “burden . . . to prove that the settlement is not
fair, adequate or reasonable”298 – yet with a focus on whether the
settlement arose through fair procedure, not whether its substance
met the Court’s approval. The actual settlement analysis that the
Court undertook focused on a list of procedural propriety issues, not
the substance of the settlement terms:
(a) “arguments that the agreement is not the product of good
faith, arms-length negotiations”;299
(b) whether “the negotiations have been prejudiced by not
allowing for the participation of additional interested
parties”;300
(c) whether the settlement “violates due process”;301 and
(d) overall, whether the settlement causes enough “legal
prejudice” to overcome “the policy consideration of encouraging
295 Id. at 1104-05 (“New Mexico brought suit . . . for determination of rights to the use
of water . . . . The United States, the four Pueblos, and about 1,000 others were named
defendants. . . . The United States intervened in its proprietary capacity as owner of the
Santa Fe National Forest and in its fiduciary capacity as trustee or guardian for the
Pueblos . . . [and] the Pueblos . . . filed a complaint in intervention.”).
296 New Mexico v. Aamodt, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (D.N.M. 2007) (emphasis added).
297 Id. (emphasis added).
298 Id. (emphasis added).
299 Id.
300 Id. at 1318.
301 Id.

2019] NO LONGER A SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION?

103

voluntary resolution of lawsuits and . . . consistency with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(2) . . . [on] voluntary dismissals of lawsuits”302 – a
framing that recognizes how deferential a settlement review
must be outside the class action context.

Paralleling CARP as to court power in collective action
settlements, the Court declined to opine on the substantive
settlement terms, instead focusing its review on procedural
propriety, ultimately imposing “a few modifications” to “the
procedure proposed by the Settlement Parties,” targeted at
protecting all parties’ rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard:
“The modified procedure will identify and serve all persons entitled
to notice, so far as they can be ascertained with reasonable diligence,
serve notice on unknown claimants by publication, and afford all
claimants the opportunity to be heard by the Court before it approves
the settlement agreement.”303
Applying a mix of its broad Rule 16 powers and its inherent
procedural powers to protect rights such as notice and opportunity to
be heard, courts adjudicating FLSA collective actions could issue
orders such as the following: that within seven days of sending
plaintiffs notice of a proposed settlement, plaintiffs’ counsel must file
proof that all plaintiffs (a) received the CARP notice, and (b) received
the settlement notice to let them opt out if they choose. Of course,
such orders are a matter of judicial discretion, so courts can of course
vary all of these details from what we propose; the basic point simply
is that courts have ample authority to assure that all plaintiffs
receive proper notices of their rights, and that defendants can know
whether a settlement is accepted by enough plaintiffs to achieve the
desired closure, without the often-infeasible practice of requiring
every one of potentially hundreds or thousands of individual
plaintiffs to execute individual settlements.
Notably, some lawyers already have undertaken, and some
courts already have ordered, measures similar to parts of CARP, to
guard against any possibility or accusation that opt-in plaintiffs did
not properly consent – to be represented by the named plaintiffs in
discovery and trial, to retain plaintiffs’ counsel, or to settle. In the
several orders by Chief Judge Krieger in the District of Colorado, for
302
303

Id.
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
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example, the Court went further than we suggest (a) in ordering
individual discovery from all opt-ins and (b) in bifurcating the FLSA
and state wage claims – but (c) in requiring detailed rightsdelineating notice, it provided for some of the CARP best practices:
[N]otice should describe the nature of the FLSA “collective
action”, the FLSA claim and remedies, and . . . the opportunity
to “‘opt-in”‘ . . . . It should also advise recipients of their right to
be represented by counsel for the original plaintiff, to obtain
independent representation, or to participate pro se. It may also
describe certain rights of an “opt-in” plaintiff (including . . . not
to be bound by a settlement that the original plaintiff advocates).
It should explain that . . . the employee can pursue an
independent action. . . .304

Unlike the above court-approved notice, opt-in forms that
plaintiffs’ counsel, pre-certification, can file are often far less detailed.
Following is an actual example of a typical bare-bones opt-in consent
that satisfies § 216(b)’s bare-bones requirement – “consent in writing
to become such a party . . . filed in the court”:305
CONSENT TO BECOME A PARTY PLAINTIFF
I, ______ , consents [sic] to sue as a Plaintiff in this action,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
By my signature below, I hereby authorize counsel to prosecute
the claims in my name and on my behalf, in this action, for
Defendants’ failure to pay overtime wages as required under federal
law.
Date: ___________
By:
________________
[Print
Name]
________________
[Signature]306

304 Johnson v. Colo. Seminary, No. 17-cv-02074-MSK-KMT, Dkt. #34, Slip Op. at 6 (D.
Colo. Nov. 20, 2017); see also, e.g., Arfsten v. Cutters Wireline Serv., No. 16-cv-01919-MSKKMT, Dkt. #35-1 , at 2 (D. Colo. May 26, 2017) (notice form with similar provisions).
305 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
306 Mickels v. Country Club Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01189-SCJ, Dkt. #4 (N.D. Ga. June 11,
2014) (emphasis in original).
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By saying literally nothing other than that the individual
“consents to sue” and “authorize counsel to prosecute the claims,”
this form leaves all of the above-detailed ambiguities in the attorneyclient relationship that trouble courts and leave counsel’s scope of
authority uncertain. To what extent do opt-ins authorize the named
plaintiffs to offer representative evidence that could determine the
fate of the entire collective action? To what extent do opt-ins
authorize counsel to negotiate a settlement that, if they do not object
to it, will bind him or her, etc.? To what extent have opt-ins agreed
to any fee or cost arrangement with counsel who surely will expect a
cut of any verdict or settlement? And with no contact information
requested, how is counsel even to assure each opt-in receives notice
of major case events?
While bare-bones forms are common, some counsel’s opt-in
consent documents do detail the retention terms and scope of
authority. More detailed opt-in consents, moreover, need not be
lengthy. Below are excerpts from a one-page opt-in form that contains
not only (a) the basic opt-in consent, but also (b) many of the key
provisions of a full retainer agreement on fees and costs, and (c)
safeguards to assure attorney-client communication, including
mutual disclosure of multiple forms of contact information (address,
email, and phone), a promise of communication from counsel when a
filing for the individual occurs, and an instruction for the individual
to contact counsel if s/he does not receive an expected confirmation
of a filing:
I authorize [counsel] … to represent me … by joining my claims
to an existing lawsuit … without prepayment of costs or fees.…
[I]f Plaintiffs are successful, costs expended by attorneys on my
behalf will be deducted from my settlement or judgment … pro
rata…. I understand that the attorneys may petition … [for] fees
and costs … paid by defendants on my behalf. I understand …
fees will be … amount[s] received from the defendant or 1/3 of
my gross settlement or judgment … , whichever is greater….
Send the completed form to [counsel’s address, fax, or email – all
listed] …. This Consent … is not valid and effective until you
have received a receipt from [counsel] indicating that it has been
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filed. If you have not received a receipt within 3 weeks … , you
must contact us by phone….307

In-between the above two opt-in forms are ones that do say the
individual retains counsel, but that say nothing about any rights or
obligations in the attorney-client relationship. One, for example,
starts by stating, “I hereby consent to be a party plaintiff,” then (after
reciting the nature of the case) states only that the individual:
(a) “authorize[s]” counsel “to pursue any claims I may have,
including such litigation as may be necessary”308 – a vague
authorization saying nothing about opt-ins’ consent to
representative evidence, rights to notice of key litigation
matters, etc.; and
(b) “hereby consent[s] [and] agree[s] … to be bound by any
settlement of this action or adjudication” – an ex ante consent to
“any” settlement that, as noted above, exceeds the authority
clients can grant attorneys.309

With such wide variation in the opt-in consents that attorneys
provide and courts order, the CARP prescriptions could serve as “best
practices” clarifying the above-detailed matters that existing practice
too often leaves ambiguous. Resolving those ambiguities, moreover,
can make FLSA collective actions more manageable to courts whose
concerns about manageability may drive many courts’ denials of
certification, insistence upon judicial use of “certification” to
supervise collective actions, and concerns about “hybrid” actions
being especially unmanageable.

V. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, Second-Class Class Action covered only half of
what needed to be said about FLSA collective actions. As a first effort
at diagnosing the field, it noted the over-use of formalized Rule 23style “certification” processes as not only unduly cumbersome, but a
misapplication of FLSA language and purposes. We are under no
delusion that some courts agreed because we were particularly
“Consent To Sue Under The FLSA,” Getman & Sweeney PLLC (on file with authors).
“Consent to Join Collective Action” in Scura v. Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc., No.
C 02-524 (WDB) (on file with authors).
309 See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text.
307
308
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persuasive; rather, in a field that only recently grew in prominence
and is under-studied by the legal literature, we called attention to a
problem that itself cried out for redress.
The other half of what needed to be said about collective actions,
though, is what this Article covers as our second effort at improving
the “second-class” status of FLSA collective actions within the field
of aggregate litigation. If Second-Class Class Action and the initial
decisions agreeing with it are correct that collective action plaintiffs
are joinder parties rather than absent class members needing
protection via “certification” inquiries, then the caselaw requiring
individualized discovery, settlement consent, and trial evidence may
provide plausible solutions – unless there is more to the analysis
than Second-Class Class Action offered.
As this Article details, collective actions remain “representative
actions” that do not require individualized treatment of each
plaintiff, and instead allow a range of litigation management devices
for aggregate litigation: representative discovery and trial evidence,
to avoid the redundant evidence and excessive burdens that federal
rules let judges limit in pretrial discovery and trial evidence;
bifurcation of liability from damages, to allow the more heavily
common-issue liability phase to occur with representative evidence,
even if the later damages phase will be more individualized; and
other creative trial and pretrial management techniques, such as
choosing bellwether trials to proceed through pretrial and/or trial, in
hopes of guiding the remaining cases to settlement or at least more
streamlined pretrial and trials.
Key to proper litigation of collective actions, though, is a
recognition that while courts lack broad Rule 23-style powers to
protect absent members by overriding party and counsel decisions,
they retain critical trial and pretrial management powers – not only
to guide the litigation efficiently (as summarized in the prior
paragraph), but to assure procedural propriety and ethics
compliance. Toward that end, and to redress the all-too-common
ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship that the ill-defined
“opt-in” process causes, we propose CARP, a set of consent, authority,
and rights provisions that clarify the rights and responsibilities of all
parties.
Following, as a hopefully helpful shorthand, is a flowchart of
how collective actions can proceed based on (a) whether plaintiffs

108

FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:1

move for court-authorized notice or instead plan a party-managed
collective action, (b) whether defendants make any misjoinder or
dispositive motion, (c) what the court decides on such motions by
either party, and (d) when the CARP provisions are triggered.
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Figure 1:
Options for Litigating and Adjudicating Wage
Collective Actions, with CARP – Consent, Authority, and
Rights Provisions

CARP is quite specific, but partly by design – because some
decertification decisions, and other decisions requiring full
individualization of collective actions, premise on concern that there
is no feasible way to manage collective actions. Whether CARP or
similar processes along similar lines, we are confident that judges
can manage collective actions in a manner that treats them as liberal
Rule 20 joinder rather than as inaptly strict Rule 23 cases requiring
close scrutiny, while also treating them as representative actions
rather than as mass individual cases to be litigated with oftenredundant individualized discovery, trial, and other proceedings.

